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Humanitarian relief operations are among the most popular uses of a government, but 
despite this, not all disasters receive international attention. This thesis’ goal is to explore 
the question: why do countries participate in humanitarian relief operations? International 
relationships are complicated and messy affairs, and the decision to deliver aid to another 
country is equally as difficult. However, it is essential to understand why and how 
countries participate in relief operations, because they happen with such frequency. Each 
section of this thesis explores a different aspect of humanitarian relief operations. First, 
the United States has a strong history of humanitarianism. The roots of this belief system 
came from the Declaration of Independence which laid out the basic rights of life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness for all of mankind. Herbert Hoover demonstrated through his 
humanitarian works that there are individual and religious trends to America’s relief 
operations. Second, the United States’ standard for participation also draws influence 
from the international community and soft power objectives. Both the 2005 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and the 2011 Japanese Tsunami identify that the United States both responds to 
international pressure, and supports close allies in need. Lastly, China’s decision making 
for relief operations is explored. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) historically 
donated much less than the rest of the international community despite their booming 
economy. This is because China does not believe that humanitarian relief is a critical 
aspect to their current economic push, the Belt and Road initiative. Rather, China has 
responded to disasters rapidly with rescue teams, and then departed the area quickly after 





continue its leadership in this role while China will continue to ignore international 
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On December 24, 2004, a magnitude 9.1 earthquake struck the Indian Ocean off 
the coast of Sumatra.1 The central location of the earthquake sent a series of tsunamis 
with 65-100 foot tall waves directly to the Indonesian coastline.2 The unstoppable 
momentum behind these walls of water rolled over the providence of Aceh, Indonesia, 
and crushed everything in its path.3 After the waters subsided, over 320,000 residents of 
Banda Aceh (the capital near the coastline) were either killed, injured, or homeless. After 
striking the Indonesian city, the tsunami continued its expansion throughout the Indian 
Ocean. Ultimately the disaster “kill[ed] over 230,000 people and displac[ed] 1.7 million 
across 14 countries.”4 When the waves and aftershocks finally receded, the world rapidly 
responded with support.  In one of the largest relief efforts in the history of mankind, the 
international community donated over $13.5 billion in aid.5 Millions of people from 
around the world contributed to the efforts. The decision for a country to participate in 
humanitarian relief operations seems straight forward, but the reality shows something 
deeper. This thesis’ goal is to explore the question: why do countries participate in 
humanitarian relief operations? 
Each countries’ response to a humanitarian disaster is different, and this paper 
seeks to find the trends in their decision making process. There is always the potential for 
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natural disasters to strike, and the consequences of poor relief support are dire. In fact, 
“between 1980 and 2004, two million people were reported killed and five billion people 
cumulatively [were] affected by around 7,000 natural disasters.”6 International 
relationships are complicated and messy affairs, and competing national interests make 
the decision to help other countries difficult. It is essential to understand why and how 
countries participate is relief operations because there is such a great risk for any country 
to be struck by a natural disaster. If nations can understand what factors contribute to 
successful international support, then they better respond when a disaster strikes in order 
to save more lives.  
This thesis is divided into three parts. Each section explores a different aspect of 
humanitarian relief operations, and each chapter has its own research question to answer. 
For the course of this paper, humanitarian relief is defined as the monetary funds, people, 
and equipment provided by a certain government to a different country or territory that 
has been struck by a natural disaster. Initially, this paper explores the background of 
American humanitarianism to gain an understanding of this vital political movement. It 
then delves into an examination of the modern decision making process of the United 
States and China. Each chapter builds on the basic understanding of what it means to be a 
humanitarian country. The final goal is to better understand the history of humanitarian 
relief and to gain an improved understanding of modern decision making for relief 
operations. All three chapters utilize various case studies to establish trends that support 
each section’s final argument.  
The first chapter explores the concept of humanitarianism in politics and aims to 
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demonstrate that the United States has developed its own unique standard for 
humanitarianism. Historically, America is at the forefront of relief operations, and 
donates a significant amount of resources to disaster-stricken countries.7 In particular, 
this chapter answers the question: what is American humanitarianism, and what are the 
American standards for participating in aid operations? To answer this question, this 
chapter first examines the existing literature on humanitarianism in politics. It then 
analyzes American historical documents to set a cultural precedent, and lastly, it utilizes 
the life of The Great Humanitarian, Herbert Hoover as a case study.8 President Hoover 
was a man who exemplified American humanitarianism throughout his life, and the relief 
operations he led demonstrated the American standard for humanitarian participation.  
The literature review identifies that humanitarian works utilize the resources of 
one person to alleviate the suffering of another, despite individual differences.9 
Humanitarianism is a belief system, that, when entered into politics, requires a 
government to assist others in need. This is not solely an international issue, and 
governments must strive to prevent human suffering at home as well as abroad.10  Critics 
point out that humanitarian operations use moral excuses to hide other national 
objectives, and while this may be true, the United States has combined humanitarianism 
with America’s national policy.11 American humanitarianism’s beginnings come from the 
Founding Fathers and the text of the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration 
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outlines the basic human rights of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” and the 
Founding Fathers intended that the United States would spread them throughout the 
world.12 The applicability of the contents of the Declaration have been debated by 
politicians for years, but there is a trend in its usage.  
President Abraham Lincoln referenced the Declaration to denounce slavery, and 
claimed all men, regardless of race, deserve basic rights.13 His argument focused on 
American’s rights at home, but he drew parallels with the humanitarian concept of 
equality for all. Next, Albert Beveridge argued that the United States needed to expand its 
influence to countries that could not take care of themselves. Beveridge was an 
imperialist, so a considerable amount of his message did not last, but he did argue that the 
United States was a leader in the world who had Divine guidance to spread these ideals 
around the globe, an idea that still has support to this day.14 Lastly, President Woodrow 
Wilson did not believe in a direct interpretation of the Declaration, and instead argued 
that its only relevance in modern times was through its spirit. He argued that big 
businesses were the new form of tyranny, and the spirit of our Founding Fathers’ 
message can guide legislation to defend the American people.15 All three of these 
politicians used the Declaration of Independence as a guide to justify the protection of the 
basic rights of life, liberty, and happiness around the world, and this belief is the basis for 
American humanitarianism.  
 
12. “Declaration of Independence,” U.S. History.org, July 4th, 1776, 
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Herbert Hoover is then used as a case study because he epitomized the ideal 
American humanitarian, and his relief operations made him a national hero. 
Unfortunately, Hoover’s influence in this area is often lost as his reputation is generally 
based on his mishandling of the Great Depression. This chapter seeks to change that 
narrative and demonstrate that Hoover’s legacy is properly placed with its lasting 
influence on humanitarian aid. Hoover’s work as a humanitarian supports the American 
goals of life, liberty, and happiness for all because his policies affected millions of people 
both home and abroad.16 He navigated war-zones and inspired the nation to conserve 
food in order to feed others.17 He spread American ideals by giving people their most 
basic right, life. His humanitarian efforts demonstrated that a single individual can have a 
lasting impact on a nation, and highlighted that American humanitarianism relies on 
individual contributions and religious organizations to provide lasting relief to a disaster-
stricken country.   
The second chapter builds on the first, and focuses on the decision making of the 
United States in modern humanitarian relief operations. It examines the question: is the 
United States’ decision to provide humanitarian relief affected by its existing relationship 
with the country involved or its need for influence in the region? To answer this question, 
the chapter first examines existing literature on decision making and humanitarian relief. 
It then examines two case studies: the 2005 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2011 Japanese 
Tsunami. America’s strategic relationship to all of the countries involved in these events 
is inherently different, and the hypothesis is that the United States provided more total 
 
16. George H. Nash, The Life of Herbert Hoover: Master of Emergencies, 1917-1918, (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 1996), 4. 
17. Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, (New York: Simon & 





resources to the countries it has stronger relationships with.  
The literature review reaches two primary reasons for why countries participate in 
relief and humanitarian efforts: moral obligation and soft power benefits. It also identifies 
two conclusions for why they do not provide aid: the legality of participation and the 
difficulties with implementing relief. A state’s resources are limited, and utilizing any of 
them on another country must be carefully thought out with the pros and cons weighed. 
In support of aid operations is the argument that humanitarian relief participation is a 
morally appropriate decision that citizens can rally around. Additionally, relief provides 
an easy political victory for leaders who support it because it is so popular with 
constituents.18 Strategically, participation also increases that country’s soft power in a 
region. “Aid, and its visibility, is an opportunity for the development of international 
relations and enhancing the reputation of a particular nation.”19  These benefits must be 
carefully compared to the loss of resources provided to a complicated, inefficient 
system.20 Governments will only participate in relief if it is in their best interest to do so, 
and even if a country decides to help, it is often unclear how much they can assist. Lastly, 
these decisions must be balanced with the danger of entering into a prolonged 
intervention. There is a high probability that relief efforts may last for years.21 This 
increases the overall cost, and further discourages participation in humanitarian 
operations.   
To answer this chapter’s research question the United States’ relief operations in 
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the 2005 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2011 Japanese Tsunami are examined. The 
United States has a fundamentally different relationship with all of the countries that 
were involved in these disasters, and strategically they care about some more than others. 
The Indian Ocean serves as a strategic region for America because it has many ports and 
contains countries that, in 2005, the United States wanted as allies in the War on Terror.22 
In contrast, Japan is a much closer ally in the region, and serves as the cornerstone of 
America’s Asian presence because the United States has military bases located in the 
country.23 Each of the four trends identified in the literature review are evident in both of 
these examples. The two most significant findings from the Indian Ocean tsunami are that 
the United States responded to international backlash after an initially low pledge of 
funds to save face, and they strategically provided funds to countries that were important 
to the War on Terror. 24  In Japan, America was much quicker to respond, and provided a 
significant amount of military personnel and resources quickly.25 This could be due to the 
American presence already in Japan, or the United States government may have learned a 
lesson from their missteps with the Indian Ocean Tsunami.  
The final chapter shifts the focus of humanitarian relief decision making from the 
United States to their strategic rival, China. China contributes much less than other 
developed countries to humanitarian relief operations. For example, in 2015, relief was 
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“only 1.7% of [China’s] overall foreign aid budget.”26 This paper seeks to answer the 
question: why does China contribute so little to disaster relief operations? The hypothesis 
is that China’s decision to provide relief is closely linked to their humanitarian aid 
priorities. In order to answer this, a literature review identifies the priorities of Chinese 
foreign policy, and then examines China’s decision making process for providing aid and 
nation building packages. Data on the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) relief 
operations is limited due to government regulations, but there is sufficient information 
available to highlight trends through multiple case studies.  
China’s current world-encompassing economic push is the Belt and Road 
Initiative, also called the One Belt One Road (OBOR). China’s vision for this initiative is 
to create a modern trade and infrastructure route comparable to the Silk Road that 
connected Asia to Europe.27 This ambitious project consists of an “infrastructure-building 
plan of roads, railways, ports and industrial hubs to connect about 65 countries.”28 Rather 
than concentrating trade efforts with Europe and Asia, this new Silk Road is global, and 
has a strong focus on Africa.29  
There is substantial literature available that analyzes many aspects of this 
initiative, and they identify three overarching themes to Chinese aid and nation-building 
projects. The first is that China cares little about international norms, and acts in a way 
the benefits their own agenda. Specifically in Africa, the PRC offers lucrative deals to 
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underdeveloped countries with few requirements attached to them.30 This directly 
competes with Western aid that usually requires these countries to changes some aspects 
of their human rights or governing.  Additionally, China provides aid to countries that the 
West frequently places sanctions on, like North Korea.31 The second theme in the 
literature is that the PRC primarily delivers relief in a way that improves their own 
economy. They focus on mutually beneficial economic packages, and any deals they 
make increase China’s access to natural resources or trade routes.32 The last theme is that 
China utilizes humanitarian aid to increase their soft power throughout the world. They 
understand that they are behind western countries in the soft power race, and see their 
nation-building as a way to catch up with the United States.33  
As previously stated, data on China’s humanitarian relief operations are limited, 
but there is enough information available to identify some clear trends in their decision 
making process. Ultimately, the PRC does not believe that humanitarian relief is a critical 
aspect to their OBOR initiative. In two of the examples provided (Japan and Haiti) China 
responded rapidly with rescue teams and pledged a low amount of aid. This led to 
positive headlines initially, but the Chinese quickly left the disaster area after this effort.34 
Of course, these initial actions also show to partner countries that China is not ignoring 
them, but it seems like China does the bare minimum to demonstrate their support. 
Ultimately, their low pledges and quick departures led to negative international attention, 
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but China failed to succumb to it. Economically, humanitarian relief is not beneficial to 
them like their aid programs are, and China focuses its resources on nation-building 
projects with mutually beneficial economic agreements. In regards to soft power, the 
PRC does not value the gains that relief provides. Rather, they believe that because they 
invest so much already in aid and nation-building, they are already improving their soft 
power.  
This thesis’ primary goal is to better understand why countries participate or do 
not participate in humanitarian relief operations. The United States has a clear cultural 
connection to humanitarian acts. This relationship can be traced back to the Founding 
Fathers and there are specific examples of its use throughout America’s history. When 
the United States provides aid, it is supported through its citizens and their beliefs. The 
government’s decision to participate leans on this support and draws influence from the 
country’s strategic objectives. In contrast to the United States, China sees little value in 
humanitarian relief operations. They do the bare minimum to maintain the relationships 
that they have, and, unlike the United States, do not succumb to international pressure. 
This paper reaffirms that a country’s decision to participate in humanitarian relief 
operations is complicated, and individual countries have different criteria to determine 











The Humanitarian Tradition in the United States:  From the Declaration of 
Independence to Herbert Hoover 
On January 12th, 2010 a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck the Haiti coastline.35 In 
an instant, around 250,000 people were killed, and the remaining 1.5 million survivors 
found themselves isolated and without basic amenities.36  The international community 
instantly announced their support, and the event “provoked a spectacular wave of 
humanitarianism” around the world.37 In the end, over $13.34 billion was donated from 
international groups to support the Haitian tragedy.38 From the United States, President 
Obama “solemnly declared less than forty- eight hours after the event that the Haitian 
people would not be ‘forsaken’ or ‘forgotten.’” 39  To back up this claim, the President 
pledged 5,000 troops and $100 million dollars in relief support.40 This action was praised 
around the world, and the soldiers and volunteer workers in Haiti gained fame for “their 
courage, their dedication, their exhaustion, their vision of the disaster, and their 
understanding of the suffering.”41 Throughout the first year of relief operations the the 
United States government and its people donated 50 percent of the total international 
relief to Haiti. They sent $3.1 billion in aid to, compared to the nearly $3 billion sent by 
the rest of the world.42 In fact, the next largest pledge (most of which had not been 
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delivered to Haiti after the first year) was from Venezuela at $1.1 billion.43  These are just 
some modern examples of many that demonstrate American commitment to humanitarian 
relief operations, and they consistently outperform other civilized countries (Figures 2, 3, 
4). The United States is clearly a leader in humanitarian relief operations, but where did 
the American tradition of humanitarianism come from and how is it sustained?   
In 1803, Congress passed the Fire Disaster Relief Act that supported Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire to help the city recover from devastating fires. This example of 
lawmaking is “‘commonly regarded as the first piece of national disaster legislation’” in 
America, and is the first example of many that demonstrate the United States’ 
commitment to care for its fellow man.44 This chapter explores the historical roots of 
American humanitarianism. In particular, it will answer the question: what is American 
humanitarianism, and what are the American standards for participating in aid 
operations? To answer this question this chapter explores existing literature on 
humanitarianism, then analyzes American historical documents, and lastly, examines the 
life of The Great Humanitarian, Herbert Hoover, a man who embodied and even shaped 
many of the springs of humanitarianism that still characterize American responses to 
global disasters.45 Herbert Hoover was a unique politician who, prior to becoming 
President, had never run for public office, but had gained national fame for his 
humanitarian work across the world. Ultimately, this chapter will use prior research and 
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source documents to define America’s cultural standard for humanitarian relief 
operations.  
Humanitarianism 
The concept of humanitarianism is not new. It first entered politics as a viable 
governing theory at the start of the nineteenth century, and has slowly become more 
significant in governments around the world.46 States utilize the belief of 
humanitarianism to defend their policy and global relations decision making, and it has 
now become a standard that has been set by international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN). The UN even included it in their bylaws and its members vowed  
“to promote ‘universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.’”47 In the vast library of humanitarianism literature there are many different 
definitions of the term.  They all come to similar conclusions, and the “etymology of the 
French word humanité…provides us a hint.”48 This word has two interpretations. The 
first is that humanité “encompasses all human beings and forms the basis for a shared 
world,” and secondly, “it is an emotional movement toward others and translates into 
sympathy for their suffering.”49 These interpretations highlight the theme of the literature 
definitions, that humanitarian works utilize the resources of one person to alleviate the 
suffering of another, despite individual differences.  
Humanitarianism has strong roots in the world’s religions. Judaism has various 
humanitarian organizations like the Ahavta and the American Jewish World Service that 
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seek to “repair the world” through the assistance of those in need.50 These efforts are not 
new, and the major faiths around the world have preached the tenets of humanitarianism 
for centuries. In fact, while “modern humanitarianism arose in early nineteenth-century 
Europe, there were organized charitable societies in the Muslim world centuries before 
then.”51 Some humanitarianism was also “born of universal Christian love,” and its 
components have a strong connection to Christian teachings.52 In particular, the 
development of humanitarianism was furthered in the United States through Christianity. 
Throughout its teachings there are examples of humanitarian acts, and the “Christian 
views of love and care for one's neighbor are fundamental to a Western concept of 
humanitarianism.” 53 Throughout the Twentieth Century, faith-based organizations have 
had “significant influence” on humanitarian relief.54 Members of these organizations 
draw influence from the New Testament, and utilize its messages as the “guiding 
charitable text for the Western world.” 55  As an example, the Good Samaritan parable is 
a guiding lesson for the distribution of aid within these organizations.56 The Good 
Samaritan tells a story that highlights the Christian principle of assisting others in need. It 
highlights that a good Christian behaves “in a thoroughly compassionate manner,” and 
“gives freely of his own time, energy, and money to help” those who need it.57 
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Christianity is not a requirement for humanitarianism, but some Christian principles like 
the Good Samaritan, parallel the theory of humanitarianism. Regardless of individual 
beliefs, humanitarians are united to “enter into the everyday world to alleviate the pain of 
those who suffer,” and this deed incorporates any human in need.58  Humanitarianism 
does not just draw its roots from Christianity, but there is also influence from other major 
religions.  
A key component of humanitarianism is that it is universal. Assistance should be 
“‘permanent, transnational, institutional, [and] neutral.’”59 Additionally, humanitarianism 
is not purely an international issue, and involves human suffering at home as well as 
abroad.  Within the constructs of this belief system are two separate concepts: 
“emergency and alchemical humanitarianism.”60 Emergency help is temporary and 
designed to alleviate immediate suffering, while alchemical humanitarianism is general 
and seeks to better the entire world.61 Emergency humanitarianism is the theme of this 
paper, and comes in the form of aid that serves to help those in extremely distressful 
situations.62 It is “a short-term endeavor carried out ‘during and in the aftermath of 
emergencies’” such as natural disasters and genocide.63 Emergency aid is unique because  
“it should be motivated by the sole aim of helping other humans affected by disasters, 
exclusively based on people’s needs and without any further discrimination, without 
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favoring any side in a conflict or other dispute where aid is deployed, and free from any 
economic, political, or military interests at stake.”64 These criteria are politically difficult 
to fulfill due to a state’s limited resources and a wide range of governmental 
responsibilities.  When a country becomes humanitarian it policies and decision making 
should focus on everyone at home and abroad.65 Unfortunately, this is not how it usually 
occurs, and oftentimes, governments neglect certain groups in need. This has led to 
claims that humanitarianism is “an inconsistent policy practice.”66 These assertions are 
part of a larger debate on what role humanitarianism plays in international politics. 
When humanitarianism is allowed in politics it is difficult to identify what role it 
actually fulfills, and, for this reason, humanitarianism has supporters and critics. 
Supporters believe that participation in relief operations answers a nation’s higher calling, 
and they “highlight how humanitarianism is a sign of progress towards human freedom 
and emancipation.”67 They see the global social benefits of assisting those in need, and 
argue that it is a government’s role to support this objective. Alternatively, “critics 
denounce what they perceive as the vicious effects of humanitarianism, notably the 
misuse of humanitarian aid,” and argue that humanitarianism leads to its own human 
rights violations.68 They contend that large countries can use humanitarian aid as an 
excuse to get involved in the affairs of a smaller nations. These stronger countries, like 
the United States, use humanitarianism as “a moral cover for” their own strategic 
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interests.69 As evidence, critics reference the inconsistency in humanitarian relief 
operations.70  A unique aspect that supports the critic’s argument is that aid projects 
historically require public support in order to gain influence. Supporters and politicians 
utilize “speeches, appeals and reports” to state their cause, and “in some, but not all 
cases, humanitarianism formed part of the politics of outrage.”71 Supporters and critics 
also fall into the liberalist and realist viewpoint for humanitarianism in politics.   
 Like proponents of humanitarianism, the liberalist viewpoint highlights the moral 
benefits of these actions. They argue “that humanitarian interventions are a manifestation 
of America's moral obligations and responsibilities as a world leader.”72 In contrast, 
realists, like critics, see the practical application of humanitarian aid for international 
politics. They argue that “states may intervene to bolster a state or assist an ally, block a 
regional hegemon or counterbalance an internal power situation when another outside 
power has intervened.”73 Overall, they are skeptical of the pure intentions behind 
humanitarian action and argue that countries will not sacrifice their own people’s lives 
for another without additional requirements.74 This viewpoint aligns with the belief that 
the United States participates in Middle Eastern affairs to help monitor oil prices.75  
Humanitarianism is a belief system that seeks to place value on all life, and its 
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supporters hold mankind accountable for the suffering of others. Its tenets are not new to 
politics, but it has slowly gained more support in recent years. The United States is 
frequently at the center of relief operations, and its leadership regularly references 
humanitarianism as a reason for participation. The next section explores the cultural basis 
of American humanitarian work, and covers the beginning of the United States with The 
Declaration of Independence and concludes with an exploration of Herbert Hoover’s 
lasting influence on the American concept of humanitarianism. Hoover is often 
overlooked as a president, but his progressivism had an early impact on supporting the 
New Deal programs in the 1930s and Hoover’s self-understanding as first and foremost a 
philanthropist (and how he shaped American springs of humanitarianism) is often lost.  
American Case Studies 
 Herbert Hoover had the nickname The Great Humanitarian, but what does it mean 
to be a humanitarian?76 Specifically, what do Americans think a humanitarian is? A 
source document for American reasoning is The Declaration of Independence. The most 
famous line in this document declares that “all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,” including “Life, Liberty, and 
the pursuit of Happiness.”77 It further asserts “that to secure these rights, Governments 
are instituted among Men.”78 This is a uniquely American belief, but the Founding 
Fathers applied it to the rest of the world.  Indeed, at the end of the Declaration they 
announced that they held “the rest of mankind, Enemies in War, in Peace Friends.”79 
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These basic rights are fundamental to policies developed in the United States government 
over the years, and how they apply to various individuals has been a source of debate. 
However, the clauses demonstrate that the Founding Fathers envisioned that life, liberty, 
and happiness were destined to extend outside of the United States.  In other words, while 
the Declaration is particularistic to the United States and its quest for independence, its 
language is universalistic, and its self-evident truths apply to all. It is the universalism of 
the American creed that especially complements the universalistic etymology of the word 
“humanite,” as noted earlier. Throughout America’s history, politicians have rallied 
around the ideas clearly stated in the Declaration, and it is through these politicians that 
the American basis for a humanitarian can be determined.  
 One of the most influential presidents, Abraham Lincoln, frequently referenced 
the Declaration of Independence in support of his views against slavery. In his speeches, 
Lincoln emphasized the civilizing guidance of the Declaration, and demonstrated how it 
would continue to influence political decision making in the future. In regards to slavery, 
Lincoln said, “I had thought the Declaration contemplated the progressive improvement 
in the condition of all men everywhere.”80 The language used by the Founding Fathers 
was vague for a reason, and the intent behind the document applies to more than just the 
American colonies at that particular moment in time. Is his argument against slavery, 
Lincoln mentions life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and argues that these basic 
rights apply to everyone. Immigrants came from all over and “they [had] a right to claim 
[these rights] as though they were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh of the men 
 






who wrote that Declaration.”81 He then finds fault in the argument that they do not apply 
to African Americans because, “If one man says it does not mean a negro, why not 
another say it does not mean some other man?”82 Lincoln’s analysis of the Declaration of 
Independence demonstrates the humanitarian concept of treating others as you would 
want to be treated. America promises “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”83 to all 
men, and its citizens have a right to help see it through.  
Nearly 50 years later, Albert J. Beveridge took a drastically different approach in 
utilizing the Declaration to define America’s role in the world. At this time, slavery was 
not the issue at hand, and Beveridge’s speeches focused on America’s international role. 
His speech, “March of the Flag,” highlighted the accomplishments of President William 
McKinley prior to his reelection, and in it he announced that the United States was “a 
noble land…that can feed and clothe the world.”84 He argued that America is uniquely 
positioned to reach all corners of the globe because it contains “a people imperial by 
virtue of their power…by authority of their heaven-directed purposes.”85 Beveridge 
emphasized the religious destiny of America and even argued that McKinley expanded 
American influence “under the guidance of Divine Providence.”86 In other words, the 
United States had a God-given destiny to spread its ideals across the world, and its 
citizens were the ones who could accomplish it.  
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In an address to Congress in 1901, Beveridge again discussed the Divinity of 
American intervention. He argued that not all states can be self-governing, and that is ok. 
“‘Life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness’ are the important things; ‘consent of the 
governed’ is one of the means to those ends.”87 God made America the country to spread 
these freedoms to the world, and Beveridge announced that “he has made us adept in 
government that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples.”88 
America has the ability to help others, therefore they should. This is righteous work that 
fulfills America’s destiny. Beveridge also addressed that helping other countries is 
expensive both in terms of man-power and money, but that the United States will only 
succeed in achieving their destiny through “the bravery of men and women’s tears, of 
righteousness and battle, of sacrifice and anguish, of triumph and of glory.” 89 The 
outcome of intervention is worth the cost to continue America’s divine destiny. It is 
important to mention that Beveridge was considered a racist and an imperialist. In fact, 
many of his speeches provided a “racially based defense of imperialism.”90 In his 
embrace of racially based imperialism, Beveridge’s influence was limited as the United 
States, for the most part, resisted this impulse.  However, the idea of extending United 
States’ influence throughout the world, a core tenet of American humanitarianism, lies at 
the heart of the natural rights philosophy of the Declaration and was and continues to be 
nurtured by subsequent generations of Americans, in different forms.    
 










Lincoln’s and Beveridge’s speeches show that American humanitarians should be 
willing to help provide the God-given rights laid out in the Declaration of Independence 
to those who need it. Both politicians highlighted the cost of doing this work. Lincoln’s 
speeches merely addressed the political cost, but eventually these beliefs contributed to 
the Civil War.  Lincoln insisted on maintaining a Republican Union between the North 
and South, and saw the ideals of the Founding Fathers and guidance to achieve this. 
Lincoln expressed that the fight to save American democracy was a much larger battle 
upon which rested the survival of self-government itself.  In his famous words: “We shall 
nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.”91 Beveridge’s ideals show 
spending money as an appropriate way to provide relief, and even demonstrated that the 
military could help. His position was more aggressive than Lincoln’s and focused on 
America’s global role rather than the preservation of the United States. Beveridge argued 
that the destiny of the United States is to provide life, liberty, and happiness to as much 
of the world as possible, and supporting those who are unable to support themselves 
through humanitarian work is an appropriate use of American resources.  
In contrast to Lincoln and Beveridge was President Woodrow Wilson, who had 
his own interpretation of the Declaration of Independence that was different than theirs, 
though, ultimately, he reached a similar conclusion on American humanitarian work. 
Like Beveridge, Wilson was a progressive, and these principles shaped his policy. He 
believed that “The laws of [America] have not kept up with the change of political 
circumstances in [America].”92 He argued that the United States was no longer “the hope 
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and the beacon of the world,” and needed to adapt to current times.93 The United States 
government was created on a theory. He argued that “the trouble with the theory is that 
government is not a machine, but a living thing,” and “it falls, not under the theory of the 
universe, but under the theory of organic life.”94 Great progress needed to be made in 
order to make America relevant again. Wilson’s issue with the Declaration of 
Independence was that it did not age well with time. “It is of no consequence to us unless 
we can translate its general terms into examples of the present day” because “it is an 
eminently practical document, meant for the use of practical men; not a thesis for 
philosophers, but a whip for tyrants; not a theory for government, but a program of 
action.”95 Wilson argues that its only relevance in modern times is through its spirit, 
which can guide legislation. As an example, tyranny in Wilson’s time was no longer the 
British Government, but existed in big business. American humanitarianism is 
demonstrated again in Wilson’s work because he states that America’s purpose is “to set 
men free, upon a footing of equality, upon a footing of opportunity, to match their brains 
and their energies.”96 The difference between Wilson and the others is how he sees the 
government responding to this responsibility.  
Lincoln, Beveridge, and Wilson all referenced the role of America in the 
international community. They believed that the United States’ destiny was to spread its 
ideals around the world. They had different interpretations of the intent of the Founding 
Fathers and argued slightly different points for why America should provide life, liberty, 










was the role of the United States. A lesser known figure, Herbert Hoover, played an even 
greater role in taking the ideas of the Declaration and solidifying them into the tradition 
of American humanitarianism.  The discussion turns now to his unique and lasting 
contribution to the humanitarian tradition. 
From Hoover to Haiti 
To determine what made Herbert Hoover the Great Humanitarian, one must look 
at his past. Herbert Hoover was the 31st President of the United States.97 With many 
Americans he is famous for being president during the opening years of the Great 
Depression and failing to prevent it, and in that sense, it may seem odd to ascribe to him 
the mantle of being a great humanitarian when so many suffered during the Depression. 
However, both at home and abroad he also “earned a reputation among common people 
as a selfless patron who staved off starvation, typhoid, and cholera during periods of 
distress.”98 During World War I, he “emerged as the greatest humanitarian of the 
bloodbath that claimed well over 10 million lives.”99 After the War, he served on the 
“American Relief Administration (ARA)” and “fed nations from the North Sea to the 
Urals,” and helped American citizens who were displaced due to severe flooding of the 
Mississippi River.100 As president, he was faced with the challenging events of the Great 
Depression setting in after a decade of prosperity, and created programs designed to help 
those most affected by the economy. Even towards the end of his life, Hoover continued 
his work, and fought to “to alleviate the scourge of famine” in Europe during World War 
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II.101 This generous man cared for millions of people across the world, and earned the 
nickname The Great Humanitarian. Hoover’s life of service started with his upbringing, 
and evolved due to a difficult childhood. 
Herbert Hoover’s youth was full of trouble and tragedy, and through these 
difficulties he developed a strong belief system. Hoover was raised under Quaker 
principles in the strict religious town of West Branch.102 His family grew up in a small 
single room cabin and supported themselves primarily through farming and gathering. 
Hoover was fond of his youth because it gave him a love of nature and made him resilient 
and hardworking. The town of West Branch was a community where “frugality and thrift 
were ingrained by religion and necessity,” and families focused on each other, school, 
and worship.103 While Hoover enjoyed some memories from his childhood, he had a 
tough time. When he was 6 years old, his father contracted typhoid and died, and then, to 
make matters worse, three years after that his mother contracted a severe cold and died. 
At the age of 9, Hoover and his other siblings were orphans.104 At this point his family 
was further divided throughout the town and each sibling received a small piece of their 
parents estate.105 Hoover realized he came from a modest background, and once even 
said, “my boyhood ambition was to be able to earn my own living, without the help of 
anybody, anywhere.”106 At the age of 10, Herbert Hoover learned a lesson that he carried 
with him for the rest of his life, that sometimes life would be difficult, and it is ok to lean 
on others for help until you can pick yourself back up again.  
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Herbert Hoover also found support in these early tragedies through his religion. 
Hoover’s belief system was established through his family, and was solidified throughout 
his lifetime. His family’s life in West Branch centered around the Quaker religion and the 
community church. When he was not helping in the fields or going to school, Hoover and 
his family were at worship. Quaker beliefs are different from other religions, and 
participants treat the world and each other with reverence. Hoover grew up understanding 
that honest labor and education were to be respected.107 His religion also encouraged only 
helping those who absolutely needed it, and when disaster struck, individuals “would be 
helped only for the duration of [their] hardship.”108 Hoover had these core Quaker 
principles throughout his life, and this belief system greatly affected his humanitarian and 
political policies. 109   
An additional attribute of Quakers is their belief in self assessment. Periodically 
devote members ask “themselves a list of demanding Queries, a self examination of 
virtues ranging from human brotherhood to moderation of speech and honor in one’s 
worldly dealings.”110 Through these Quaker Queries, Hoover recognized that his earlier 
life was not fulfilling, and he realized he needed to help more people. His solution was to 
enter public service in order to “create a social and economic system which [would] so 
function as to sustain and enrich life for all.”111 He invested time in himself and began to 
study political topics such as history and economics.112  Finally, his opportunity to benefit 
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others in public service arrived, and at the outbreak of World War I Hoover found his 
calling.113  
After the German invasion, Belgium faced massive food shortages and needed 
help. Hoover believed he had the solution, and out of London he founded the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) “to procure and provide food for the desperate 
civilian population.”114 He had already become famous for his “compassion and 
organizational abilities” from his earlier years when he was an engineer, and was 
handpicked to redesign the relief movement.115 The CRB delivered that assistance and 
was widely successful. Through the War’s blockade, Hoover delivered food to over 9 
million people during the War.116  This was a complex program to lead that required 
Hoover to expertly manage relationships with both British and German leaders. He was 
so trusted by both sides that he was able to make this humanitarian relief operation the 
largest the world had ever seen. Throughout this process, small decisions Hoover made 
drew back on his youth and Quaker roots. One example is that Hoover was so committed 
to this effort that he sold his shares in a profitable Burma mine in China117, and he 
refused a salary while he ran the CRB.118  These funds were directly given to the CRB’s 
efforts. Hoover’s selfless donations directly provided relief to all of these displaced 
people. This humanitarian effort propelled Hoover to international recognition, and 
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directly contributed to President Wilson selecting him to lead the United States Food 
Administration after America’s entry into the War.119 
In his capacity with the Food Administration, Hoover served on the War Cabinet 
and “endeavored to stimulate food conservation and food production, to control surging 
inflation of food prices, and to create surpluses of exportable foodstuffs for America’s 
allies.”120 In the War Cabinet, Hoover’s progressive thinking began to show itself. One of 
his most forward-thinking plans was to make “the government itself enter the market and 
operate within it as its biggest-hence dominant-player.”121 This allowed the government 
to have a more direct role in price development in order to keep the food market 
stabilized. Again, Hoover performed admirably, even though “time and again on the food 
front, emergencies arose.”122 One specific example of his successful efforts was in his 
food conservation campaign. Herbert Hoover rallied the country around food saving 
initiatives. He created chants like “Food Will Win the War,” and “Do Not Help the Hun 
at Meal Time,” to gain support in households across the nation. By the end of the War, 
“20 million housewives joined the food army.”123 The regulations and initiatives he 
placed on Americans during the War made Hoover a household name. Suddenly people 
would “hooverize their dinners,” and they took pride in conservation.124 The American 
people during the War were hard, and unyielding. They wanted to support the troops and 
War efforts from their homes, and Herbert Hoover provided them an avenue to do it.  
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Herbert Hoover saw progressivism as a path to make America better, but his 
humanitarian successes did not immediately translate into political victory. In fact, he 
was so popular after the War that “his name entered as a candidate in presidential 
primaries for both parties” in 1920.125 Of course, he lost, but, Hoover’s fame ensured that 
he would still have a strong presence in the United States, and in the 1920’s he was 
appointed as Secretary of Commerce. Hoover remained active in this role, and 
maintained a constant public presence throughout Calvin Coolidge’s presidency.  In 
1927, Hoover was again able to support a great humanitarian crisis after the Mississippi 
River floods. As the flooding increased and more of the population was displaced, 
Coolidge received pressure to let Hoover fix the problem.126 Coolidge granted this wish 
and placed Hoover in charge of the relief effort. In this role, Hoover aggressively pursued 
a solution, and coordinated for emergency supplies to be delivered to the disaster area 
while simultaneously constructing well-designed refugee camps throughout the region.127 
His efforts were a success and all but ensured Hoover was the front runner for President 
in the following year.  
In 1928, Hoover campaigned for President of the United States. He was an 
immensely popular candidate, and during the Republican’s Kansas City convention his 
supporters declared that, “‘nothing escapes [Hoover’s] view. His trained mind marshals 
every factor and where he proposes a remedy it neglects nothing the omission of which 
would disturb the final solution.’”128 He was so famous and successful that his critics 
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even had a difficult time finding anything wrong with him. In fact, Hoover was so 
popular that most American’s had a difficult time identifying reasons not to elect him 
president.  
“At fifty-three years of age he was a unique character in American life, 
universally known but still largely private figure, an unknown quantity full of 
promise and ineffable appeal. Unlike the career politicians that he liked to 
disparage, Hoover had a story outside the drawing rooms where the party hacks 
did their business. He’d be orphaned at an early age, worked his way through 
school, and made his fortune in faraway lands.”129  
In other words, Hoover was a self-made businessman. It would be hard for anyone to win 
against a person with Hoover renown. Any negative publicity Hoover received failed 
with the voters, and throughout the whole campaign he was a clear favorite.130 An 
additional reason for his success was that because of the “deceiving glow of the 
Coolidge-era prosperity,” of which he was the new face of  the party.131 He ended up 
winning the election in a landslide. “He received 58 percent of the popular tally and 444 
electoral votes to [his opponents] 87.”132 In comparison, President Obama only won the 
2008 election 365 electoral votes to John McCain’s 173. 133 Hoover’s victory was 
decisive, and few elections have been so straightforward. These results demonstrated how 
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excited the United States was with their new president, and the American people had high 
hopes with what the Great Humanitarian could do in office. 
When the Stock Market Crash occurred in October 1929, no one could anticipate 
that an event as significant as the Great Depression was beginning. When the crash led to 
an initial public panic, “the White House quickly emerged as the command center in 
formulating a national response.”134 The President and his Cabinet originally believed 
that the economy would bounce back from this drop because it had been so strong. 
Hoover and his advisors could not comprehend that it was anything more than a short 
term problem, and even announced it to be a blessing that so many people were selling 
their stocks. They argued that the funds taken from stocks would “release large amounts 
of capital from the speculative market for employment in business and industry.”135 
Despite these beliefs, Hoover still proposed significant policies to aid those affected by 
the crash. 
 His first policy recommendations came from a progressive background and 
included “a dramatic expansion in federal public works to augment employment” and 
increased tax cuts.136 These policies would provide jobs and encourage businesses to 
increase their investments,. Herbert Hoover recommended “them on a scale never seen 
before.”137 In the end, millions of dollars were pledged by cities and states across 
America with big businesses even announcing expansions to provide more jobs. These 
initial actions were lauded by economists and politicians alike, and in the first few 
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months after the crash it appeared that America would recover. 138 These policies tied 
back to Hoover’s Quaker roots because they focused on providing jobs for Americans 
rather than giving away free support. Hoover knew that sometimes people need help, and 
their communities can provide it to them.   
As unemployment rose and the drought in the south became worse, Governors 
approached Hoover for monetary assistance, but he would not provide it.139 Rather, 
Hoover focused on delivering the supplies necessary for families to rebuild including: 
“reduced rail rates, road projects to provide work for idled farmers, loan guarantees for 
stock feed and for spring planting, and, where local charity would not suffice, material 
assistance by the red cross.”140 Of note, throughout these actions, Hoover continued to 
focus on local relief and again he only provided the resources they would need to help 
themselves. He gave them jobs, loans, and provided them with a better system to 
transport their supplies on. Hoover was adamant that the federal government was to only 
have limited involvement.  
After Herbert Hoover left the presidency, he was immensely unpopular. However, 
at the onset of World War Two he again worked to help alleviate the suffering of starving 
women and children in Europe. His main role in this conflict was to voice opposition to 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) approach to relief operations. Hoover believed 
that Roosevelt’s efforts throughout the entire conflict did too little to improve the 
situation.141 Of course, FDR wanted to help the starving population, but he had 
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difficulties balancing his desire with the demands of Great Britain who saw starvation as 
another weapon to fight Germany.142 Hoover was relentless and “repeatedly scor[ed] the 
administration for its insensitivity, and yet the British were unalterably opposed to 
relief.”143 FDR tried to work with Great Britain throughout the entire conflict, but had no 
success overcoming their desires.144 Hoover argued that this decision could not be made 
by the president and appealed to the American people and Congress to enact change.145 
Ultimately, nothing significant came out of his effort, and the war ended without Hoover 
regaining his status as the Great Humanitarian.146  
At the end of his time in office Hoover was unpopular, but he had accomplished 
more than the country gave him credit for. In four years he “spent more money on public 
works than all his predecessors combined,” and “added 37,000 miles of highway.” 147 The 
accomplishments though could not stop the Great Depression from overtaking the 
American people, and when his reelection campaign occurred he was soundly defeated 
by Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Great Humanitarian had been placed in an impossible 
situation, and he did what could in order to improve the lives of those Americans who 
were struggling.   
Analysis 
This chapter seeks to find an answer to the question: what is American 
humanitarianism, and what is the American cultural standard for participating in relief 
operations? Humanitarianism is a belief system centered around assisting those in need 
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regardless of any personal differences. It focuses on the most basic qualities of the human 
experience, and seeks to ensure that all people have, at a minimum, their basic rights. A 
key component of humanitarianism is that it is universal, and assistance is intended to be 
“‘permanent, transnational, institutional, [and] neutral.’”148 Additionally, 
humanitarianism is not purely an international issue, and alleviates human suffering at 
home as well as abroad.  American humanitarianism is not a pure form of the belief 
system. No country can be. Humanitarians are neutral, and a government based on its 
principles would help others in need regardless of state preferences or international 
strategy. This is not realistic because states have their own agendas. Despite this, it is 
apparent through this literature review that the United States has its own unique 
application of the principles within humanitarianism, and as a country, consistently assist 
other countries in need more than their international peers (Figures 2, 3, and 4).  Since its 
conception, the United States has defined the basic human rights as life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. The Founding Fathers carefully worded The Declaration of 
Independence in order for these rights to extend to all people, not just Americans. The 
applicability of its contents have been debated by politicians for years, but it is evident 
that humanitarian concepts have been justified using its themes.  
President Lincoln referenced the Declaration to denounce slavery, and claimed all 
men, regardless of race deserve these rights. The anti-slavery movement itself “is often 
portrayed as the earliest manifestation of humanitarianism” in politics.149 Lincoln’s 
argument highlights the humanitarian viewpoint that basic rights are universal. No matter 
 
148. Aditi Surie von Czecbowski, “Humanitarianism: Histories, Erasures, Repetitions,” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 3, no 3 (2017): 614. 






what race or background an individual has, it is America’s job to ensure their protection. 
Of course, Lincoln’s position only referred to American citizens and immigrants, but he 
is not the only politician to use the Declaration to justify humanitarianism. Both 
Beveridge and Wilson’s viewpoints highlighted some additional themes.   
Beveridge’s argument was that the United States needed to expand its influence to 
countries that could not take care of themselves. He believed that it was the role of the 
United States to provide this assistance to those who need it, and thought that America 
was an example for the world to follow. He called upon the military and admitted that 
increasing the United States’ influence would cost government resources including 
American lives and money. His imperialist message draws parallels to humanitarianism’s 
critics who see the United States’ participation in relief as a means to exert their own 
agenda in another country. In contrast, Wilson’s message focused on the home front.  He 
argued that the Declaration’s only relevance in modern times is through its spirit, not its 
direct text. However, this spirit can guide legislation to defend the American people. He 
worried that big businesses had taken the people’s basic human rights, and saw the spirit 
of the Founding Fathers as a solution to creating new regulations. Like President Lincoln, 
Wilson’s message demonstrates the American government’s desire to provide the basic 
rights to everyone in need, and focused on the home front.  
The Declaration of Independence took its bearings not from a revealed faith but 
from a deistic position and from the secular idea of natural rights.  It announced that life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness were endowed upon man by their Creator. These 
natural rights cannot be taken from anyone, and it is the United States’ responsibility to 





Founding Fathers intended for it to spread throughout the world. Both Lincoln and 
Beveridge emphasized God throughout their speeches. Beveridge even announced that 
expanded American influence was “under the guidance of Divine Providence.”150 He 
believed the same as many Americans, that the United States had a God-given destiny to 
spread its ideals across the world. Despite the separation of church and state, the United 
States’ calling to humanitarianism is directly tied to its religious leaders and citizens.  
Herbert Hoover epitomized the ideal American humanitarian, and his relief 
operations made him a national hero. He was loved by Americans, who demonstrated 
their support for his humanitarian actions when they elected him president by 444 
electoral votes to 87, an impressive margin.151 Hoover’s work as a humanitarian supports 
the American goals of life, liberty, and happiness for all because his policies affected 
millions of people both home and abroad. His influence traversed war-zones, and his 
message inspired the nation to conserve food in order to feed others. Hoover utilized his 
personal capabilities to navigate the discourse of war and politics in order to provide food 
and water to millions of families facing famine and flood. He spread American ideals by 
giving people their most basic right, life. Hoover’s humanitarian work highlights three 
trends in his use of humanitarianism that the United States still uses today in its relief 
operations: individual donations, religious organization, and the form of aid. 
Individual donations. Many of Herbert Hoover’s plans for relief in the Great 
Depression focused on local communities. He believed that the federal government 
should not be involved in matters where neighbors could provide the best help. Hoover 
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had two reasons for not supporting government aid. “The first was the old and familiar 
argument against government assistance-that dispensing aid would reward shirkers and 
discourage enterprise.”152 The second was Hoover’s conviction “that replacing local 
relief with federal dollars threatened to ‘stifle’ that neighborly impulse to charity that 
Hoover saw as essential to the American character.”153 This view of the world was 
developed by how Hoover grew up in West Branch. His town and family provided 
support to him after he was orphaned, and ensured that young Hoover still had 
opportunities growing up. He learned at a young age that sometimes life would be 
difficult, and it is ok to lean on others for help until you can pick yourself back up again. 
This draws an important parallel to humanitarian relief operations. American citizens will 
rally themselves around a crisis to provide help. In World War I, they supported Hoover’s 
conservation initiatives and “hooverized their dinners.”154 Even Hoover himself selflessly 
donated his CRB salary to the relief efforts. Individual sacrifice for humanitarian relief is 
a trend that continues to this day. In 2010, the America public donated over $4 billion to 
the Haiti crises through non-governmental organizations and charities.155 Furthermore, 
individual citizens organized fundraisers like “The Hope for Haiti telethon,” that used 
celebrities like Madonna to raise $66 million in relief funds.156 When the American 
people rally behind a tragedy, there has always been a strong humanitarian desire to 
provide support.  
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Religious support. Another theme in American humanitarianism highlighted in 
Hoover’s accomplishments is the influence of religion. The town of West Branch was a 
community where and families focused on each other, school, and worship.157 Quakers 
are frugal and hardworking, and see value in self sufficiency. Despite this, Hoover’s 
tough childhood also solidified his belief is community support. An additional attribute of 
Quakers is their belief in self assessment.158 Through Quaker Queries, Hoover recognized 
that his earlier life as an engineer was not fulfilling, and he realized he needed to help 
more people. Hoover pursued the Good Samaritan life, and part of this life is the call to 
humanitarian actions. He searched for ways to act with compassion and freely devoted 
“own time, energy, and money to help” those who need it.159  When World War I began, 
Hoover had already become famous for his “compassion and organizational abilities” and 
was selected to head the relief movement, and donated his own salary and mine shares to 
the operations.160  His plans inspired Good Samaritan actions around the world, as he was 
allowed to operate across enemy lines to provide essential aid to a starving population. 
This religious call to action is a trend that still exists today in American humanitarianism. 
In the Haiti earthquake crises, “some of the largest donation totals were for faith-based 
organizations.” For example, “Catholic Relief Services raised $136 million, World 
Vision raised $41 million, and the United Methodist Committee on Relief raised $14.5 
million.”161 These three groups provided nearly five percent of the total private donations 
 
157. Glen Jeansonne, Herbert Hoover: A Life, (New York: Berkley, 2016), 8. 
158. Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1984), 60. 
159. Bharat Ranganathan, “On Helping One’s Neighbor,” The Journal of Religious Ethics 40, no. 4 (2012): 
660.  
160. Glen Jeansonne, Herbert Hoover: A Life, (New York: Berkley, 2016), 104. 
161. Carol Adelman, “Haiti: Testing the Limits of Government Aid and Philanthropy,” The Brown Journal 





received from the entire world.  The United States has a large Christian population, and 
their belief system strongly supports American humanitarian relief operations.  
Form of Aid. Herbert Hoover’s relief work also highlighted the type of resources 
that the United States provides in relief operations. As a Quaker, Hoover held certain 
traits, and his beliefs led him to expect “the able bodied…to support themselves.”162 
Hoover’s priorities for aid emphasized this expectation because he strived to provide the 
minimum resources for people to recover from a tragedy. His religion also encouraged 
only assisting those who absolutely needed it, and when disaster struck, individuals 
“would be helped only for the duration of [their] hardship.”163 After becoming president, 
Hoover’s programs combating the Great Depression tried to provide jobs to Americans, 
and he avoided the concept of free aid. Hoover developed a system to make food delivery 
cheaper so that families could eat for less, and Hoover expected people to work in order 
to get the economy moving again. His first policy recommendations after the stock 
market crash included “a dramatic expansion in federal public works to augment 
employment” and increased tax cuts to increase the flow of money in the economy.164 
These policies provided jobs, and alleviated some of the hardship for American citizens. 
Hoover’s aid recommendations directly parallel current United States aid strategies. In 
Haiti, the aid that the America still provides “focuses on long-term reconstruction and 
development, promoting economic growth, job creation and agricultural development, 
providing basic health care and education services, and improving the effectiveness of 
government.” There still is a time when free aid is appropriate, and much like Hoover 
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provided food to Europe in the middle of a War, the United States will still ensure “the 
immediate needs of food-insecure households” in Haiti.165 Primarily though, American 
aid packages assist Haiti in developing its own agricultural production, and it focuses on 
additional ways to assist the Haitian government’s ability to take care of its own people. 
To do this, the United States delivers skills training and expertise to help government 
officials manage the country on their own.166 American humanitarianism seeks to deliver 
only the minimum requirements for immediate relief, and then tries to provide the 
essential training and tools for a country to take care of itself after a disaster.  
In the end Hoover’s efforts to combat the Great Depression fell short, but he felt 
that he had done plenty. At that point in American history, his reforms were the largest 
ever, and his various programs and initiatives raised millions of dollars from the 
government, big businesses, and Good Samaritans that he then poured back into the 
community. His humanitarian efforts demonstrate that a single individual can have a 
lasting impact on a nation, and highlighted that American humanitarianism relies on 
individual contributions and religious organizations to provide lasting relief to others in 
need.   
Conclusion 
The basics of humanitarianism are not new -- for thousands of years humans have 
assisted their neighbors in need. When humanitarianism enters the political sphere, it is 
the expectation that governments will assist people in need both at home and abroad.  
This help should be universal and unbiased. Critics point out that humanitarian operations 
use moral excuses to hide other national objectives. This may be true, but in the United 
 






States, there has been a uniting of humanitarianism with America’s national objectives. 
This chapter has aimed to demonstrate that the United States has developed its own 
unique (and generous) standard for humanitarianism. It began with the Declaration of 
Independence and through the years has solidified itself into American politics. The basic 
human rights of life, liberty, and happiness were declared by the Founding Fathers with 
the intent to spread them throughout the world.  This chapter focused some attention on 
the life of Herbert Hoover because he epitomized the American humanitarian. His early 
ability to focus on the plight of the world’s suffering has continued to shape the 
American concept of giving.  Unfortunately, Hoover’s influence in this area is often lost 
as his reputation has been consigned to that of mishandling the Great Depression, but this 
chapter demonstrated that Hoover’s legacy, while certainly mixed, is properly placed in 
its lasting influence on humanitarian aid. His humanitarian efforts demonstrate that a 
single individual can have a lasting impact on a nation, and highlighted that American 
humanitarianism relies on individual contributions and religious organizations to provide 
lasting relief to a disaster stricken country.  The next chapter examines the current 
decision making process of the United States, and seeks to discover if the need for 











Chapter 2: The United States and Humanitarian Relief Decision Making 
In 2011, a devastating tsunami struck the coast of Japan. Instantly, thousands of 
people were killed and the survivors were displaced from their homes and cut off from 
their livelihoods. During this hectic time, countries around the world sent aid to assist in 
the protection of Japanese men, women, and children. The help was swift and substantial.  
Among those countries that provided relief was the United States.167 America quickly 
supported their ally, and sent the military to provide humanitarian relief in Operation 
Tomodachi.168 This operation cost the United States military nearly $90 million, but 
provided critical aid to Japan when the country needed it most.169  
As the first chapter identified, the majority of Americans react positively towards 
humanitarian relief operations, and rally to support other countries when disaster strikes. 
Despite this, the United States government does not provide aid in every situation. This 
paper analyzes how the United States government makes the decision to assist another 
country in need. For the course of this chapter, humanitarian relief includes the monetary 
funds, people, and equipment provided by the United States Government to a non-US 
country or territory that has been struck by a natural disaster. The first two chapters of 
this thesis explores the different aspects of the United States’ decision to participate in 
humanitarian relief, and the last chapter examines how China makes the same decisions. 
This chapter examines the United States’ existing relationship with the country involved, 
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and how the need for influence in the region affects the government’s decision to provide 
humanitarian relief. 
Literature Review 
 There is a large volume of literature on the interaction between the United States’ 
government, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations’ (NGOs) 
participation in various humanitarian relief operations. Most studies cover the successes 
and failures of various relief operations in order to better understand what areas can be 
improved. Few look at the specific decision-making process of the governments and 
organizations involved. Articles that do tend to focus on the individual causes of a 
government’s participation, rather than analyzing multiple factors. As a result, the articles 
generally fail to address alternate reasoning for a nation’s participation. In addition, there 
are a multitude of studies highlighting why a government would not get involved in a 
humanitarian relief operation.  
Overall, the literature reaches two overarching conclusions about why countries 
participate in relief and humanitarian efforts: moral obligation and soft power benefits. It 
also reaches two conclusions for why they do not provide aid: the legality of participation 
and the difficulties with implementing relief.  
Moral Obligation. The United States government appears to have a moral 
obligation to help other countries after a disaster strikes.170 Humanitarianism is defined as 
“the principle under which moral sentiments enter the political sphere.”171 Moral 
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sentiments in government are not restricted to disaster areas, but involve making political 
decisions based on the suffering of people that are less fortunate.172 Because of this 
perceived moral obligation, politicians are eager to back legislation in order to win the 
support of their constituents. This has been demonstrated many times through the actions 
of the American government. For example, in the 1980s, the United States came to the 
aid of Ethiopia during its famine. In describing why the United States was involved 
President Ronald Reagan famously said: “a hungry child knows no politics.”173  
Humanitarian reasoning is a powerful force in American politics because it carries 
a strong message of saving lives and preventing innocent suffering.174 This message 
influences the public’s opinion, which is a “crucial audience for humanitarian action”175 
A politician is more likely to support humanitarian legislation if it is popular among his 
or her constituents. This is evident because when humanitarian relief operations are 
covered by the news, it is the stories of the participating government, not the affected 
individuals that get spread.176  The news has to highlight the positive operations of the 
nation involved in order to emphasize that a country’s contributions are successful. In 
these operations, “it is never enough to be building houses: the donor country or countries 
must, also, be seen to be building those houses.”177 Ultimately, the perceived moral 
obligation of a nation to help those in need is a powerful force in the decision to provide 
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Soft Power. Involvement in humanitarian relief potentially influences a nation’s 
soft power. Soft power is defined as “the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes 
one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment.”178 This attraction is built 
through “culture, values, and policies,” and sharing these factors expands a country’s 
influence.179 “Aid, and its visibility, is an opportunity for the development of 
international relations and enhancing the reputation of a particular nation: it is part of a 
strategic mission.”180  
The basis of soft power lies in America’s ability to gain a political advantage 
overseas without using an expensive military force.181 “Foreign interventions, benign or 
not, shape attitudes. In addition to their charitable mission, humanitarian assistance 
operations are also considered to have a positive informational component, contributing 
to improved perceptions of the United States.”182 The impacts of humanitarian 
intervention have been explored previously by analyzing the favorability polls in 
countries where America provided aid. By comparing the United States’ favorability 
ratings before and after relief was provided, research showed that participating in these 
operations gave America a positive view among citizens in the country that they helped. 
183 
Participation in humanitarian relief operations is another tool for politicians to use 
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while advancing their own agendas. For example, President Ronald Reagan started the 
campaign to help Ethiopia in the 1980s because ignoring an internationally recognized 
famine would have negatively impacted his foreign policy plan.184 In 1992, the United 
States “authorized the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Program 
(OHDACA) to allow the Department of Defense (DoD) to transport humanitarian 
supplies” in order to help achieve strategic goals.185 OHDACA gives America the ability 
to utilize soft power operations through the DoD. Since this program’s implementation, it 
has helped countries all over the world including Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Djibouti, Kenya, Ghana, and Bolivia.186 Additionally, military operations in 
Afghanistan have been focused on winning the hearts and minds of the local population 
as a part of the nation-building strategy of the United States. Gaining the support of the 
local population through humanitarian operations diverts support away from the terrorist 
groups in the area.187 The United States is a world power, and the international 
community expects its assistance in times of need. It just so happens that filling this role 
also accomplishes America’s strategic objective of expanding its influence across the 
world.  
Legality. Despite the positive reasons for government participation in 
humanitarian relief operations, there are barriers to one country helping another. One 
such barrier is the legality of intervention and the sovereignty of the states involved. The 
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complexities required with executing humanitarian intervention cause it to “remain a rare 
and selective event,” and because of these difficulties, it takes a truly horrible situation 
for the United Nations Security Council to get involved.188 In the 1990s, the United 
Nation’s Security Council tended to avoid humanitarian issues that involved a sovereign 
country with a recognized leader. “Perpetrator governments were unlikely to be subject to 
humanitarian intervention during the 1990’s unless the sovereignty of the perpetrator 
government was suspended or delegitimized by the Security Council.”189 This, however, 
appears to be changing as the United Nations’ humanitarian intervention in Libya 
occurred while it was a sovereign nation. In order to allow for this, the council declared 
that the crisis was “not only considered a threat to international peace and security but 
also an assault on common humanity.”190 This shift shows a growing acceptance of the 
demand to provide relief to those that need it despite the legalities of intervening in 
another country’s affairs.   
Another way state sovereignty affects relief efforts is that the choice to provide 
resources or receive help is up to the individual nations. Governments will only 
participate in relief if it is in their best interest to do so, and even if a country decides to 
help, it is often unclear how much they can assist. For example, "the UN may only offer 
such services as its members are willing to provide and may possess only so much 
legitimacy and authority as its members voluntarily accord it.”191 It is difficult to interact 
with another country in crisis, especially if that country limits what aid they are willing to 
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accept. All of this research shows that international laws, and the regulations in a specific 
country, impact the decision of a state or organization to provide humanitarian relief. 
Difficulties in Implementing Relief. Humanitarian relief operations are more 
popular than they use to be, and because of this, extra resources are devoted to them. 
“Since the end of the Cold War there has been an exponential increase in the scope, 
visibility, and size of the international humanitarian movement.”192 With these increases, 
there has also been a growth in the number of states and NGOs that show up when a 
country is in need. Each organization comes with a separate command structure and its 
own objectives in mind. This is “the result of haphazard growth on a lot of separate and 
often very different organizations which needed much great coordination and coherence 
to be properly effective.”193 Their lack of efficiency leads to resources being wasted. 
Additionally, within these organizations there is “a lack of formal rules [which] provide 
[states] with maximum flexibility in the event of an emergency”194 This flexibility can be 
a good thing because it offers opportunities to provide aid to all who need it, but 
unfortunately it causes more problems than benefits. “On the whole, this flexibility comes 
at a substantial price in preventable delays, expenses, and administrative barriers to relief 
operations.”195 This inefficiency makes executing humanitarian operations increasingly 
expensive. 
Another factor driving the cost and difficulty of humanitarian relief is that states 
and NGOs are more effective at successfully at preventing loss of life. Advancing 
 
192. James Thompson, “Humanitarian Performance and the Asian Tsunami,” The Drama Review 55, no. 1, 
(2011): 72. 
193. John Holmes, “Humanitarian Response in the 21st Century,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, 
no. 2 (2001): 115. 
194. David Fisher, “International Disaster Relief: A Growing Regulatory Dilemma,” Proceedings of the 






technology has allowed for information on a disaster to be instantly available and 
potentially gives workers the ability to arrive on-site in a matter of hours with emergency 
equipment in hand.196 These capabilities help ensure that basic human needs are met in a 
disaster area quickly. Now, relief operations must last longer in order to care for all of the 
people in the region that are still alive. The basic survival needs have been met by an 
expanding community of relief organizations, but these difficulties raise the cost and 
make coordination harder between all of the different groups and countries that are 
helping.197 With this progress, the expectations of relief operations have grown, and it is 
apparent that the current method cannot provide the optimal solution.  
Another concern among governments is that “international humanitarian relief 
program circumstances actually serve to prolong conflict.”198 This does not necessarily 
mean that help should not be given to those in need, but individual countries or NGOs 
must consider the consequences before committing resources. Relief efforts may last for 
years, and are increasingly expensive. One area that countries focus on is humanitarian 
relief in a combat zone. Civilians in a war area are in desperate need for help, but it can 
be risky to provide relief to them if there is not an active movement to also end the 
conflict.199  
All together, these studies reveal the complexity involved in a government’s 
decision to help another country in crisis. A state’s resources are limited, and utilizing 
any of them on another country must be carefully thought out with the pros and cons 
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weighed. For one, humanitarian relief participation is a morally appropriate decision, and 
the citizens of a country can rally around a relief movement. Strategically, participation 
also increases that country’s soft power in a region. These benefits must be carefully 
compared to the loss of resources provided to a complicated, inefficient system, and the 
danger that participating in an operation could put the country at risk for prolonged 
intervention.  
Data/Methodology 
This thesis chapter examines the question: “Is the United States’ decision to 
provide humanitarian relief affected by its existing relationship with the country involved 
or its need for influence in the region?” As the literature review identified, this is a 
complicated question. There are many factors that contribute to a nation getting involved 
in humanitarian operations, and every situation is different. This chapter explores the 
following hypothesis: The United States provides a quicker response with more resources 
to a humanitarian crisis when it has a strong existing relationship with the affected 
country and desire to obtain more influence in the region. The disaster endangers a 
significant amount of the population and destroys the country’s existing infrastructure. To 
test this hypothesis, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2011 Japanese tsunami are 
examined as case studies. Both instances involved a strong earthquake that produced a 
devastating tsunami, affected millions of people in the same region of the world, and are 
within a decade of one another.  
The 2004 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami 





the coast of Sumatra.200 Immediately following the earthquake, a series of massive 
tsunamis with waves ranging from 65-100 feet tall, were detected. The bulk of these 
waves struck the providence of Aceh in Indonesia, which was only 60 miles from the 
epicenter of the earthquake.201 The tsunami decimated everything in its path, and the 
320,000 residents of Banda Aceh (the capital near the coastline) were either killed or 
homeless. After striking Aceh, the tsunami continued to spread throughout the Indian 
Ocean, ultimately “kill[ing] over 230,000 people and displac[ing] 1.7 million across 14 
countries.”202 Of all the damage caused by the tsunami, Aceh took the brunt of it. “[T]he 
ratio of dead to injured survivors was 6:1.”203 After the water subsided, the 1.7 million 
survivors found their livelihood and possessions gone, and now had to make a plan for 
the future.   
After the immediate danger from the waves had passed, the worst was far from 
over. At that point, they fought to prevent a secondary crisis due to lack of adequate 
shelter, food, and clean water. In Indonesia alone, the refugees needed over 700 tonnes of 
food a day. Relief forces utilized aircraft, trucks, and ships to deliver the supplies in a 
massive coordinated operation.204 In addition to providing food and water, all of the 
displaced people required enough tents to support entire cities.205 These efforts saved 
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many lives, but they still could not prevent the spread of diseases as living conditions 
suffered, and unclean water was consumed by survivors.206 
Along with a total loss of infrastructure in cities throughout the region, the Asian 
economy suffered greatly following the event. The primary industries in these countries 
were gone overnight. Fishing, farming, local commerce, and the multimillion-dollar 
tourist industry suffered major loses. The magnitude of destruction took every country 
involved by surprise, but the international support was instantaneous. Ultimately, “the 
world’s response to this terrible natural disaster was an unprecedented $13.5 billion in 
international aid, including $5.5 billion from the general public in developed nations.”207 
Initially, the United States provided $15 million to the nations hit by the 
Tsunami.208 This number grew amid critiques from the international community and as 
the situation grew in severity.209 In the end, “the US response to this international disaster 
was swift, generous, and effective, including approximately $1 billion in aid from the US 
government.” 210 In response to the tsunami and the American government’s response to 
it, President George W. Bush said “From our own experiences, we know that nothing can 
take away the grief of those affected by tragedy. We also know that Americans have a 
history of rising to meet great humanitarian challenges and of providing hope to suffering 
peoples.”211 America provided this hope primarily through the DoD in Operation 
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UNIFIED ASSISTANCE. “By January 5, 2005, only 10 days after the earthquake and 
tsunamis, UNIFIED ASSISTANCE included over 25 United States Navy ships, 45 fixed-
wing aircraft, and 58 helicopters, and delivered more than 610,000 pounds of water, food, 
and other supplies to the region.”212 The military provided capabilities such as cargo 
airlift and airdrop in order to deliver supplies to stranded people throughout the region.213 
In the end, the United States provide $857 million to all of the regions affected by the 
Indian Ocean Tsunami,214 and America deployed more than 15,000 troops in support of 
UNIFIED ASSISTANCE.215  
The DoD was not the only resource that the United States sent to the area, and 
“within the first day … U.S. Ambassadors and embassy staff, including USAID missions, 
were on the ground working with national and regional governments to disburse 
emergency funds, identify relief needs, and provide rapid assistance.” 216 This 
immediately identified what issues limited the abilities of relief work, and submitted 
plans back to Washington to expedite the process of fixing them.217 In addition, the 
United States led “an international ‘Core Group’ that included Australia, Japan, India, 
Canada, the Netherlands and the United Nations to coordinate the first stages of the 
international response.” 218 The goal of this group was to communicate the capabilities of 
all the countries and organizations involved in order to efficiently and effectively provide 
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as much relief as possible.219 Combined, all of the countries sustained a total of $15.8 
billion in damages220, and over 1.7 million people were displaced.221 Relief efforts took 
years to enact, and the  tragedy of the tsunami forever changed the region.  
In 2004, Indonesia had a population of over 238 million, which was “the world’s 
fourth largest population after China, India, and the United States.” 222  Historically, 
Indonesia and the United States have had a weak relationship, filled with minor 
arguments and few agreements. In 2004, the relationship was at a low point. After the 
2001 terrorist attacks, the United States worried about what role Indonesia would play in 
the Islamic Extremism movements taking over the Middle East.223 In addition, Indonesia 
was undergoing political changes of their own, and “many in Washington feared that 
Indonesia would become another Yugoslavia: a country long held together by 
authoritarian rule that would fracture along ethnic and religious lines to become a failed 
state and threat to regional stability.”224  
Despite these fears and the difficulties working with Indonesia, the United States 
viewed them as a prime example of what a moderate Islamic country looked like, and 
they “regard[ed] Indonesia as strategically important in the war against terrorism.”225 
This unlikely alliance faced backlash in Indonesia, because many citizens held the 
“suspicion that the United States-led war against terrorism [was an] attempt to advance 
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American power and undermine the Islamic world”226 This belief fueled anti-American 
movements within the country, and were supported by many Indonesian politicians. 
Ultimately, when the Tsunami struck in 2004, the relationship between the United States 
and Indonesia was contentious, but the United States still provided Indonesia at least 
$245 million for roads alone.227 This was a generous amount of money to help cover the 
estimated $4.45 billion in damages to Indonesia’s infrastructure.228 This money, and 
additional operations, also provided relief for the 532,898 people affected.229 The 
Indonesian government was receptive to United States’ aid, but demanded that foreign 
militaries leave their country by the end of March 2005.230  
Indonesia was the hardest hit, but India also saw extensive losses. India incurred 
$1.22 billion in damages,231 far less than Indonesia, but they had a total of 647,599 
individuals affected.232 In 2004, relations between India and the United States were 
strong. “India's size, its increased economic interdependence with the United States, its 
political stability, its democratic form of government, and its geographical placement all 
ma[de] it a priority for foreign policy.”233 In the early 2000s, the United States “felt that 
the role of a ‘dynamic and democratic India’ might help shape ‘the Asian balance and 
tackling global challenges,’” specifically to counter Pakistan and China.234  The efforts to 
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partner with India started in the 1990s under the Clinton administration, and culminated 
in January 2004 when President Bush agreed to The Next Steps in Strategic 
Partnership.235  This alliance “paved the way for mutual cooperation in civilian nuclear 
energy and space program, high-technology trade, and missile defense development.”236 
In addition to these efforts, India played a strategic role in the region because of its 
nuclear capability.237 The United States had great interest in keeping India as a strategic 
ally, but after the tsunami, India was reluctant to accept aid. Indian officials even 
received criticism for hindering relief operations in their country.238  
Aside from India, one of the smaller countries affected by the tsunami was Sri 
Lanka. The tsunami hit Sri Lanka harder than India, but it had less damage than the 
devastated Indonesia. In 2004, America’s interactions with Sri Lanka were limited, 
though America started taking an increased interest in Sri Lanka peace in late 2001.239 
This search for influence contrasted with the strategic value Sri Lanka had for 
America.240 In fact, “the United States [had] no significant strategic interests in Sri 
Lanka, certainly in comparison to other areas of enhanced United States engagement.”241 
At the time, the American military held a positive relationship with Sri Lanka’s armed 
forces, but they were not as integrated or involved as they were with other countries in 
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Economically, American “interests in Sri Lanka [were] limited. United States 
trade with Sri Lanka [was] relatively insignificant, at about $2.3 billion in 2005.”243 The 
only strategic interest Sri Lanka held in 2004 “derived from the feeling in the post-
September 11, 2001 world that the threat from terrorism had to be confronted globally, 
and that governments facing terrorist threats should cooperate against them.”244 In this 
role, the United States took a stronger position than they previously had with Sri Lanka, 
but still support trailed behind other countries in the region. After the tsunami hit, Sri 
Lanka was provided $134.6 million in relief supplies245 to counteract the estimated $1.45 
billion in damages sustained by the country.246 This money went to the estimated 519,063 
displaced people within Sri Lanka.247 The government accepted United States assistance, 
but kept a close watch on the funds and “issued guidelines for construction near the 
coast.”248 
The 2011 Japanese Tsunami 
On March 11, 2011, a 9.1 magnitude earthquake occurred off the northeast coast 
of Honshu, Japan.249 Instantly, massive waves large enough to swallow a three-story 
building rose up from the ocean, and proceeded outward.250 Being the closest to the 
epicenter, Japan took the brunt of the damage, though significantly smaller waves from 
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the tsunami reached as far as California.251 The time residents had between the 
earthquake hitting and the coast getting struck by the tsunami was between 10-30 minutes 
to get to higher ground and move away from the coast.252 Many people were unprepared, 
or received no warning. When the wave struck, thousands of people stood between it and 
safety. Whole buildings, trains, ships, roads, and bridges were swept away with 
individuals on them.  
This event devastated Japan. On June 8, 2018, the National Police Agency of 
Japan released their updated estimates of the damages caused by the tsunami. Their final 
numbers were 15,896 people killed, 2,537 people missing, and 6,157 people injured. In 
the end, over 1.7 million buildings were destroyed or damaged, along with over 4,400 
roads and bridges.253 In the end Japan suffered $235 billion in damages to the country,254 
and had over 470,000 displaced people.255 These numbers are significant, but fail to 
capture the overarching panic that developed from the issues this much damaged caused. 
After the event, over two million households were without power, and the roads in the 
localized area of the tsunami were damaged so badly it affected shipments of equipment 
and supplies. Sendai’s airport “suffered extensive damage,” and six major shipping yards 
were destroyed.256 All of this damage hindered rescue and relief operations to the point of 
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endangering those people that survived the tsunami. Initial efforts to provide food, water, 
and other supplies were well under acceptable levels, as authorities could only deliver ten 
percent of them to the region.257  
On the day the tsunami struck, efforts began to help protect survivors and 
evacuate the area. This evacuation became a massive operation as over 180,000 people 
had to be relocated from Fukushima after the nuclear reactors started melting down.258 
Japan’s grief from the event was met with a considerable international movement to 
provide humanitarian relief to the devastated country.  
The United States was quick to support their ally, and sent the military to provide 
humanitarian relief to the area in Operation Tomodachi.259 President Obama said of the 
event, “The United States stands ready to help the Japanese people in this time of great 
trial. The friendship and alliance between our two nations is unshakeable, and only 
strengthens our resolve to stand with the people of Japan as they overcome this 
tragedy.”260 The United States took this stance when the 7th Fleet showed up and 
provided personnel and equipment to help deliver food, water, and supplies to the 
stranded population. United States forces were deployed and assisting Japan within 24 
hours of the disaster.261 In addition, they supported with search and rescue efforts in the 
area. The DoD also opened airfield operations at the United States-owned Yokota Air 
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Base near Tokyo to accept aircraft that could not land at Narita Airport.262 This operation 
deployed approximately 20,000 troops, including over 18,000 personnel from the Navy. 
Nineteen ships and 140 aircraft provided the capability to deliver critical supplies in hard-
to-reach locations. Many of these military personnel came from the 50,000 troops already 
stationed in Japan.263  All of these efforts were praised by the Japanese Government, who 
was receptive to the United States’ participation. Prime Minister Naoto Kan even stated, 
“the United States has been making various proposals from a very early stage. At least, as 
far as I know, we have gladly accepted almost all of their offers, and all that are 
necessary.”264 
After the immediate actions to stabilize the situation, Japan moved toward 
reconstruction. This required clearing out miles of cluttered land while building new 
homes, roads, and docks. This entire infrastructure was required to rebuild the 
community and economy that was lost. One of the biggest issues was the impact on the 
Japanese economy. “Reemployment [was] a major issue. The disaster-stricken region is 
home to many parts manufacturers, farmers and fishermen. The area’s fisheries industry 
in particular has always thrived.” 265 Rebuilding that market was crucial to the area 
regaining stability. 
The Japan Center for International Exchange researched the total funds provided 
by the United States government and its citizens to this tragedy, and discovered that, 
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overall, a total of $730 Million was given to the country.266 This amount “makes the 
outpouring of US giving for Japan the largest philanthropic response ever in American 
history for an overseas disaster in another developed country, and the third largest for any 
overseas disaster.”267 Deploying 20,000 soldiers and sailors in Operation Tomodachi 
itself cost the United States military nearly 90 million dollars.268 The final figures from 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) showed that America 
donated an additional $7 Million in non DoD aid.269 In the end, this disaster strengthened 
the United States’ partnership with Japan.  
After the end of World War II, the United States and Japan built a strong 
relationship, in fact, “Japan is America’s key ally in the Asia-Pacific, with the United 
States–Japan alliance the foundation of America’s role as a ‘Pacific’ power.” 270 Japan 
allowed the United States to extend their influence into the Pacific region, and served as a 
key ally during the Cold War. This relationship started with an American promise to 
provide security to Japan, and in exchange, they were allowed to open military bases on 
Japanese islands.271 The Japanese began questioning their role in this arrangement in the 
early 2000s. “Conservative Japanese politicians… began implementing a revisionist idea 
of Japan as a normal nation.”272 This movement called for increased participation from 
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the Japanese government in security issues. They wanted the relationship to shift from 
America protecting Japan to a more symbiotic security relationship. Ultimately, “It also 
aimed to revise the United States‒Japan alliance so that Japan would have greater 
autonomy from the United States and so that the relationship would become more 
‘equal.’”273  
Analysis 
This chapter evaluates the American response to humanitarian crisis through the 
lens of the governmental relationship with the affected country. As stated above, the 
hypothesis is that the United States provides a quicker response with more resources to a 
humanitarian crisis when it has a strong existing relationship with the affected country 
and a desire to obtain more influence in the region. The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and 
the 2011 Japanese tsunami each provide an example to analyze this argument, as the 
United States provided substantial aid in both events.  Additionally, both disasters 
affected millions of people in the same region of the world, and occurred within a decade 
of each other. 
While both of these events involved an earthquake and a tsunami, the tragedies 
were not the same, and these variances must be acknowledged. For one, the scope of 
damage between the two events is different. The Indian Ocean tsunami killed over 
200,000 more people, and displaced over a million more than the Japanese tsunami.  
Fourteen nations were affected by this event, compared to the one affected by the 2011 
Japan tsunami.274 Many of the areas affected in 2004 were undeveloped, which created a 
different set of problems for relief workers. For example, Aceh was a complete loss, 
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largely because the city was not designed to survive an event like that. The undeveloped 
areas would also have less governmental support in overcoming the issues. The Japanese 
government had resources in place to start providing aid quickly, and while they could 
not do it alone, there was a system already in place to divide supplies. Despite these 
differences, the events provide crucial clues to answer the hypothesis.  
Studies of humanitarian relief had identified two reasons why countries 
intervene—moral obligation and soft power—and two reasons why they might not 
intervene--legality of participation and the difficulties with implementing relief.  The rest 
of this chapter analyzes these two events and compares the United States decision making 
based on these four factors. The United States’ initial commitment to the 2004 tsunami 
was concerning, and highlights the importance of soft power for America in the 
international community. The day after the event, President Bush pledged $15 million 
dollars to the crisis. At that time, the scope of the devastation was limited, but the number 
faced immense international backlash.275 It appeared that the United States did not care 
about the countries in that part of the world. Once that message was received by the 
public, President Bush immediately raised the pledge for aid. This number continued to 
grow as more details about the tragedy emerged. This scenario does raise into question 
the international response to United States aid. President Bush made an error that affected 
America’s soft power abroad when he initially committed fewer resources than other 
nations. Whether this was intentional or not, the United States ended up making a 
significant impression on the international community after donating nearly $1 billion in 
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Both of these events also highlight the government’s moral obligation to 
participate in humanitarian relief. Both President Bush and President Obama appealed to 
the morality of assistance in their remarks on the events. In addition, public donations in 
both examples were generous, and ultimately, millions of dollars were donated by 
American citizens for relief. This supports the idea that Americans were invested in the 
tragedies, and through their donations, American citizens demonstrated to their 
government officials that they demanded humanitarian relief be provided to these 
afflicted populations.  
These examples also highlight the complications of dealing with other countries. 
The United States had a strong relationship with Japan, and the Japanese government 
allowed the United States to assist a great deal.277 They provided an airfield to support the 
delivery of aid, and Japan accepted nearly all offers the United States gave them.278 
Conversely, the Indian Ocean tsunami involved 14 different countries of varying 
development.279 India reacted differently than Indonesia and Sri Lanka. India wanted to 
take care of itself as much as possible, and even hindered relief operations in their 
country.280 Indonesia agreed to military help for only a certain amount of time, and 
demanded that foreign militaries leave their country on their own terms.281 Sri Lanka 
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accepted United States assistance uniquely as well, and even “issued guidelines for 
construction near the coast.”282 
Of the four countries, Japan held the most positive relationship with the United 
States prior to their disaster. The country is still America’s most valuable ally in the 
Pacific, and holds America’s military bases. In 2011, this was also the case, though 
Japan’s desire to redefine the alliance may have placed the United States government in a 
situation where they wanted to remain relevant.283 Of the three countries affected in the 
Indian Ocean tsunami, India had the strongest relationship with the United States. The 
country was a democracy with nuclear capabilities, and is one of the largest countries in 
the world. Its government and military made it a strong ally in a region that also 
contained Pakistan and China. In addition, the United States and India had just agreed on 
a new deal bringing them closer together in early 2004.284  Indonesia on the other hand, 
was a country where many citizens held negative feelings towards the United States. 
America wanted a closer relationship with the Muslim country and hoped they would 
serve as an ally in the War Against Terrorism.285 Lastly, compared to the other countries, 
the United States held a weak relationship with Sri Lanka in 2004. While America was 
involved with Sri Lanka, the country had little strategic value. The United States had 
small interest in growing the relationship past where it already was.286  
 The United States provided humanitarian relief at differing speeds for the Indian 
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Ocean tsunami and the Japanese tsunami. American aid to the Indian Ocean tsunami 
started small and gradually grew to become substantial. The United States still provided 
assistance to the affected countries within 24 hours, but it was limited. Japan, on the other 
hand, received significant aid quickly. United States military forces arrived and assisted 
in relief operations within 24 hours of the event, and the initial commitment from the 
United States was larger as well. Of course, this could be due to the military presence 
already in country. The Pacific fleet possessed resources in Japan that could assist right 
away, and the United States Air Force had aircraft in Yakota Air Base ready for instant 
deployment. 
The United States provided substantial aid to all of the countries involved in these 
two crises. As Figure 1 points out, Indonesia received $459.75 in American aid per 
person displaced, and Sri Lanka received $259.31 per person. The entire Indian Ocean 
Tsunami disaster saw $504.11 per person and 1 American soldier was provided to assist 
per 113 displaced individuals.   These numbers are based on the allocated aid given to 
each country, and are made by dividing the amount of American aid provided by the 
number of displaced persons. Using this analysis, Japan received $206.38 per affected 
person, and 1 American soldier was provided to assist per every 23.5 displaced Japanese 
citizens.  
These numbers highlight some aspects of United States humanitarian relief. Sri 
Lanka received the least amount of aid in the group, and Indonesia received the most. 
These numbers also were only the announced amount of aid provided to each country. 
With the Indian Ocean region totaling $857 million of aid, it is possible that each country 





received an average of $504.11 per displaced person.  More United States soldiers were 
sent to Japan, but this could be due to the military bases already located there. In 
addition, many Americans live in Japan on these bases, so the United States is interested 
in protecting them.  
Any United States response to a humanitarian crisis will utilize its effective 
military. The Air Force, Navy, and Marines provide a unique skillset that expand relief 
operations and can provide critical supplies to any place in the world at any time. When 
comparing the DoD response to each of these events, the numbers are similar. Operation 
Tomodachi deployed approximately 20,000 troops, 19 ships, and 140 aircraft.287  
UNIFIED ASSISTANCE included 6 additional US Navy ships over the Japan response, 
but provided only 103 total aircraft.288 The fewer aircraft could be accounted for due to 
the lack of airbases in the Indian Ocean. Yakota Air Base is in Japan, and the United 
States has aircraft in Korea. The location in the 2011 tsunami was also more centralized. 
The 2004 event required a wider area of coverage, and while aircraft can fly anywhere, 
they are significantly limited in the amount of supplies they can deliver. In comparison, 
navy ships can carry much more.  
Japan received less government aid than the countries affected by the Indian 
Ocean tsunami, but they received more American soldiers. Multiple reasons account for 
this. For one, the United States already had a strong military presence in the country, so 
military assets were already within helping distance after the disaster struck. Secondly, 
Japan was a more established country than Indonesia or Sri Lanka. The Japanese 
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government was more prepared to react to a disaster like this, and there were existing 
systems already in place to distribute supplies. Additional aid was needed because Japan 
did not have enough resources to complete the recovery alone, but they already possessed 
the infrastructure to rebuild. Japan also Ultimately, many factors contributed to Japan 
receiving less money than the Indian Ocean region.  
The most significant factor supporting this chapter’s hypothesis was that the United 
States only increased aid for the Indian Ocean tsunami after international backlash. While 
America eventually increased the amount of aid, the government’s initial pledge of $15 
million paled in comparison to other developed countries. It appeared as if the United 
States did not want to commit resources to the disaster and was testing the international 
community to see if countries were actually watching their response. Only after it was 
highlighted negatively did American change its position. One can argue that the initial 
amount was given when the United States government did not fully understand the 
significance of the event, but damage was still done to America’s image. This was not the 
case with Japan. The initial pledge for Japan was significant and highlighted America’s 
relationship with their ally. Of course, other factors may have contributed to the decision 
to help Japan quickly. For one, the United States may have learned from the backlash 
after the Indian Ocean tsunami, and did not want to repeat the mistake.  Additionally, the 
United States was under new leadership with President Obama, and America needed to 
protect its own soldiers living in Japan. Lastly, in 2010, just one year prior to the 
Japanese tsunami, Japan’s economy was valued at $1.28 trillion, the 3rd largest in the 
world.289 Their strong economy could affect the amount of aid that a country would 
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provide them because they may be able to recover on their own. Future studies could 
explore if there is a correlation between a state’s wealth and the amount of donations that 
a country receives. 
An additional explanation for the substantial monetary support provided by the 
United States to the Indian Ocean tsunami is their desire to increase influence in that 
region. This would contribute the soft power argument made by the previous literature. 
The events of 9/11 and the War on Terrorism changed United States international 
interests. America was already an ally of India, but wanted to improve their relationships 
with Indonesia. The predominately Muslim country had strategic value that the United 
States could not ignore. Indonesia had a fraction of the community that was anti-
America, and the United States providing critical aid could have improved this view. 
America was also looking to find allies in Muslim countries that could increase their 
influence in the Middle East. Indonesia was as an excellent opportunity to gain an ally in 
the region.  
Conclusion  
 The United States’ decision to provide humanitarian aid to a country or region in 
need is based on many factors. Both the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and the 2011 
Japanese tsunami required the United States government to provide relief to those 
affected. The swiftness and amount of the relief provided by the United States varied, and 
America had a stronger relationship with Japan than with Indonesia, India, or Sri Lanka. 
These case studies support the existing literature on humanitarian relief operations, but 
they only loosely support this chapter’s hypothesis.  





for the Indian Ocean tsunami after international backlash. This decision made it appear 
that the United States did not care about the region. After this backlash, America 
provided substantial funds to the area which also served a strategic role. America wanted 
to increase influence in the region to assist with the War on Terrorism. Lastly, Japan 
received less government aid than the other countries affected despite being America’s 
strongest ally. Rather than providing money, the United States provided additional 
American soldiers. 
The next chapter examines in depth the moral obligation and cultural background 
of Humanitarian Relief operations in the United States through the analysis of the life of 
The Great Humanitarian, President Herbert Hoover.290 Lastly, the final chapter will 
evaluate the moral and political decision making of the People’s Republic of China to 
determine exactly why they participate in relief operations. This thesis then concludes 
















Chapter 3: China and Humanitarian Relief Decision Making  
The first chapter of this thesis defined what constitutes American 
humanitarianism and identified that there is a historical precedent for the United States 
government to participate in relief operations. The United States is a country that is 
uniquely invested in humanitarian events, and its tends to be far more generous than other 
countries (Figure 2, 3, 4). The second chapter furthered this analysis with two case 
studies that highlighted that in addition to humanitarianism, relief operations provide soft 
power benefits to the United States. This chapter will explore this topic through the 
decision making of America’s rival global power, China. 
 China has the stated goal of utilizing its government and economy to weaken the 
United States, and their international politics often challenge America’s hegemony in the 
world.291 Despite this stated objective, China contributes much less than other developed 
countries to humanitarian relief operations. In fact, in 2015, relief was “only 1.7% of 
[China’s] overall foreign aid budget.”292 This paper seeks to answer the question: why 
does China contribute so little to disaster relief operations?  This question is in part 
difficult to answer because the government keeps close guard on its records but also 
because of how limited China’s relief aid is.  However, one can glean from its approach 
to development aid that China employs a similar strategy to humanitarian relief aid.  
Thus, in order to answer the question at hand, this paper first examines the current 
foreign relations policies that exist in China. It then covers the current literature on the 
subject with a special focus on how China’s One Belt Road Initiative lies at the heart of 
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its decision making on not only development aid but also disaster relief aid.  The chapter 
concludes with several case studies to determine what factors affect China’s humanitarian 
relief operations decision making.  This paper will demonstrate that humanitarian 
motivations are not an active factor in China’s decision making for humanitarian relief 
efforts and that China aid has been severely limited and contained due to realpolitik 
calculations.   
China’s Foreign Policy 
China’s current foreign policy has slowly been developed since the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) took control of the government. The current state of 
international relations began with the signature of “the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
Existence” agreement with India in 1954.293 While this agreement solely involved India, 
the PRC often references it in foreign policy decisions, and it is apparent that the Five 
Principles provide a framework for current international decision making in China. The 
five principles it lists “are: mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and 
sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual noninterference in each other’s internal 
affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.”294 Through these 
principals, China has justified improving their relationships with bordering countries like 
India, Thailand, and North Korea, and PRC leadership frequently references them while 
outlining their blueprint for future Chinese global dominance.295 A core concept laid out 
in the principals is peaceful growth. The PRC wants “to assure other countries, especially 
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regional partners, that its rise [does] not pose a threat to world peace and security, and 
that [they] promote a peaceful international environment.”296 Finally, China has 
frequently used these principles to help justify their economic expansion under their 
current foreign development program the Belt and Road Initiative.297  
China’s current world encompassing economic push is the Belt and Road 
Initiative, also called the One Belt One Road (OBOR). It was confirmed by China’s 
President Xi Jinping in 2013, when he simultaneously announced its “two main 
components: the land-based ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ (SREB), and the Century 
Maritime Silk Road’ (MSR).”298 China’s vision for this initiative is to create a modern 
trade route comparable to the Silk Road that connected Asia to Europe.299 Their current 
plan takes the original trade route a step further, and involves a complex “infrastructure-
building plan of roads, railways, ports and industrial hubs to connect about 65 
countries.”300 Rather than focusing on Europe and Asia, this Silk Road is global, and has 
a strong focus on Africa.301 The original Silk Road enabled international trade and 
boosted the Chinese economy and influence in the world. The OBOR initiative is China’s 
most influential economic foreign policy and is a slow strategy that will take many years 
to complete, but the PRC hopes that this expansive plan will provide China with the exact 
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same benefits in the future.302  
Literature Review 
Current literature on China’s humanitarian relief operations as defined in this 
thesis is limited, however, there is a substantial library on Chinese humanitarian aid and 
nation building not related to disasters. These are two inherently different foreign policy 
decisions, but aid and nation building are a core concept of the OBOR, and this paper will 
compare the decision making of both concepts to better frame China’s relief operations. 
Previous literature that has explored this question in regards to Chinese humanitarian aid 
and nation building policy reached three overarching conclusions. The first is that China 
cares little about international norms, and acts in a way the benefits their own agenda. 
The second is that the PRC primarily provides relief in a way that improves their own 
economy. The last is that China utilizes humanitarian aid to increase their soft power and 
expand their influence around the world.  
Against International Norms. China’s decision making often counters the 
traditional thinking of other developed countries to the frustration of the United States 
and their western allies. China’s focus is on their own growth, and their decision making 
process tends to go against international norms in order to achieve this goal. 
Internationally, China has joined a list of other developed nations who have increased 
their aid to poorer countries in recent years. Countries that join China on this list include 
“the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Korea, Venezuela, India, Kuwait and Brazil.” 
303 These countries act directly against international norms and give aid with their own 
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individualized terms attached to it. Western aid is known to have many prerequisites for 
the recipient countries. When they invest in poor nations, the West requires “that [these 
countries] work to improve good governance,” or that they “incorporate adequate 
environmental and social protections within development projects.”304  Additionally, the 
gift of aid could require undeveloped countries to make human rights changes that they 
do not necessarily want. Now, China and these other countries ignore the western 
standards and make their own deals that are “more generous and more attractive” then the 
western counterparts.305 These countries do not work with the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) that helps establish international aid 
guidelines.306 Rather, they avoid international regulations and offer specialized “loans, 
credits and debt write-offs with special trade arrangements and commercial investments” 
that solely benefit themselves and their own economy.307 The region where these deals 
are most evident is Africa. 
In Africa, most of China’s nation building support focuses on bolstering energy 
and infrastructure in undeveloped countries. Their funding in these sectors increases the 
international  partnerships of China around the world, and further expands the Chinese 
economy.308 Recipient African countries find it difficult to turn down the packages the 
Chinese are offering, because they the promise so much and come with few requirements 
attached to them. As countries increasingly take Chinese deals, it makes the West weaker 
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economic investments, intense political and cultural interactions, and ongoing 
peacekeeping and peace building activities in Africa have sparked insecurity for the 
United States.”310 These development goals have also been echoed by China’s leader, Xi 
Jinping, who has “emphasized that China’s socialist model of development offers ‘a new 
choice for other countries’ because it would fast-track their development without 
sacrificing their sovereignty to any nation with interventionist inclinations.”311 This “fast 
track” is the offer of resources to developing countries with less requirements the 
Western countries.  In particular, Chinese participation in Africa has humanitarian roots, 
as much of their business dealings with these countries involves delivering relief and 
infrastructure to the area. The rest of the world is not as confident though that these 
activities are as noble in nature as they appear.  
The second way that the PRC acts against international norms is through its aid 
support of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Internationally, this 
relationship frustrates Western countries because the United Nations (UN) often places 
sanctions on the DPRK, but Korea is able to work around them because of their 
relationship with China. The PRC’s humanitarian aid with North Korea “appears to 
follow well-established patterns in decision-making and implementation,” and efforts to 
assist the DPRK are deliberate.312 China ignores international community regulations 
with North Korea, because aid allows them “to pursue its own political goals 
independently of the goals of other countries.’” These goals with North Korea 
 
310. Earl Conteh-Morgan, “The United States and China: Strategic Rivalry in Africa,” Insight Turkey 20, 
no. 1 (2018): 39. 
311. Ibid., 51. 






simultaneously make Western countries weaker because their sanctions hold less 
influence.313 China’s decision to assist North Korea also draws inspiration from the next 
trend in Chinese aid literature, mutual economic benefits.  
Economic Goals. The second trend that current literature identifies as a reason 
for China’s involvement in humanitarian aid is Chinese economic growth. A core 
question discussed throughout the literature is: are China’s actions purely economic in 
intention, and is aid used as “simply a means to enhance material power and influence in 
crisis affected regions, in competition with Western states and other emerging 
powers?”314 In general China has three goals in mind when they make a foreign relations 
policy. The first is to “expand China’s access to markets, investment, and technology.” 315 
This new access simultaneously enables their second goal, to “gain access to strategic 
resources.” 316 Finally, in order to achieve the first two objectives, China works to 
reassure international players “that China’s growth will not undermine their [own] 
economic interests.”317 The PRC’s aid projects exist to secure “mutual economic 
benefits” between China and any country that they provide resources to.318 This is a 
theme that exists in all of their partnerships around the world, as “projects are mostly 
implemented by Chinese enterprises and are often closely linked to Chinese economic 
interests.” Of note, Africa is a significant investment for China, and there has been a 
substantial increase in trade in the last two decades. In fact, “trade between China and 
 
313. Ibid., 1161. 
314. Miwa Hirono, Exploring the Links Between Chinese Foreign Policy and Humanitarian Action: 
Multiple Interests, Processes, and Actors (United Kingdom: Humanitarian Policy Group, 2018), 1. 
315. Evan Medeiros, “China’s Expanding Diplomatic Toolkit,” in China’s International Behavior: 
Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification (RAND Corporation, 2009), 62-64. 
316. Ibid. 
317. Ibid. 






Africa tripled from $10 billion in 2000 to $30 billion in 2004.” 319 All of the increased 
loans have economic ties for China, and their funding is provided by “state-owned 
enterprises,” and any contracts are awarded “to private Chinese companies.” 320 China’s 
economic growth in Africa and been so substantial that by 2004 “674 Chinese companies 
had established themselves in 49” African states.321 
An additional reason for PRC participation in humanitarian aid is to gain access to 
new trade avenues and natural resources. Many of their infrastructure projects increase 
China’s “access to raw materials” and place Chinese influence in “countries of economic 
and strategic significance.” 322 This race is not purely a Chinese phenomenon, as other 
global powers like the United States, India, and Brazil continuously try “to source raw 
materials in Africa in exchange for new technologies and manufactured goods,” but 
China does so at an alarming rate.323 Their policy is to use “trade, investment, and, 
increasingly, finance policies to support China’s diplomatic goals…by ensuring access to 
foreign markets.”324 International partners tend to believe that China’s existence in Africa 
stems from its desire to have access to the natural resources there, and evidence supports 
this claim. The PRC has increased investments in “resource-rich countries such as 
Angola, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Algeria, and Zimbabwe.”325 Chinese access to 
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these countries is solidified because the equipment and resources they provide to help 
mine natural resources is retained by state owned companies.  
These companies provide critical infrastructure to the region, and expand China’s 
ability to transport oil and other strategic minerals quickly anywhere in the world.326 
Within this policy foreign aid plays a major role. Aid is split into two parts, 
“development and humanitarian assistance.” 327 Development includes “grants, loans, and 
technical assistance” to countries that desperately need it. 328 Officially in public record, 
the amount of development aid China provides is lower than other developed countries, 
but when state sponsored businesses and banks are included in the figures, China 
“‘becomes a major source of foreign aid.’”329 Most of the aid provided by the PRC is 
development aid, emergency aid in the form of humanitarian assistance is a far smaller 
number and is further explored in this paper.  
As mentioned above, China is one of the greatest investors to the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), a country that consistently faces international 
sanctions for a myriad of reasons including human rights violations.  It is evident that 
China provides support to them, but “data on Chinese aid to the DPRK are scarce.”330 
What scholars have determined is that in 2008, “China’s aid to North Korea [was] 
‘‘approximately 40 percent of its overall ODA[Official Development Assistance].”331 
This number has steadily grown over the last years.332 More specifically, “the PRC’s food 
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aid to North Korea…was found to have been motivated by geostrategic and security 
objectives.”333 The aid they provide also generally contains the same products that they 
give other developing countries, like food, farming supplies, and fertilizer.334 
Additionally, construction is one of the primary avenues that they support the DPRK, a 
resource that simultaneously provides jobs to the Chinese economy.335  
Soft Power. As the PRC looks to increase Chinese influence in the world, its 
leadership understands that it cannot solely rely on hard power programs to influence 
other countries. “Soft power is defined as the ‘ability to obtain desired outcomes through 
attraction rather than coercion or payment.’”336 China understands that additional 
influence can come through the reputation they have around the world, and while soft 
power is a relatively new concept to China, it is now a integral part of their strategy.337 
The PRC is aware that “the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and 
Japan currently enjoy a commanding lead over China in soft power terms.”338 In response 
to this deficit, President Xi has announced that soft power is necessary in order to “realize 
the ‘Chinese Dream,’ the revitalization of Chinese society and achievement of national 
glory.”339 Furthermore, soft power is crucial to their efforts of “peaceful development,” a 
concept derived from the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence .340  Peaceful 
 
333. Czeslaw Tubilewicz, “The Politics of Compassion: Examining A Divided China’s Humanitarian 
Assistance to Haiti,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 12, no. 3 (2012): 456. 
334. James Reilly, “The Curious Case of China’s Aid to North Korea,” Asian Survey 54, no. 6 (2014): 
1170. 
335. Ibid., 1169. 
336. Mikail Kalimuddin and David Anderson, “Soft Power in China’s Security Strategy,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 12, no. 3 (2018): 116. 
337. Ibid., 114. 
338. Ibid., 115. 
339. Ibid., 114. 
340. Thokozani Simelane and R. Managa, Belt and Road Initiative: Alternative Development Path for 





development “is not a new notion in China’s soft power diplomacy, but it became official 
policy in China” in the early 2000s.341   
Their soft power objectives reach further than humanitarian relief operations and 
extend into the massive economic investment they have made in Africa.342 One thing is 
clear, China now utilizes foreign aid to assist in their goal of strengthening political 
relationships with neighboring countries and strategic African partners.343 The PRC is 
clearly still behind in soft power, but their rapidly growing economy has provided them a 
rare opportunity. In order to capitalize on it, China needs to figure out how to “sustain its 
rapid economic growth” while hoping the United States’ economy slows down. 344  
 In sum, scholarship in this area identifies three aspects of China’s decision 
making process for providing humanitarian aid to developing countries in reference to the 
One Road One Belt initiative: China goes against international norms, they secure aid 
that provides mutual economic benefits, and the PRC has a desire for aid to expand their 
soft power. Developmental aid is inherently different than relief, but this paper proposes 
that there are similarities in China’s decision to provide humanitarian relief.  The ultimate 
goal of this chapter is to answer the question: why does China participate in less 
humanitarian relief operations than other developed countries? The hypothesis is that 
China’s decision to provide relief is closely linked to their humanitarian aid priorities. In 
order to answer this question multiple case studies of Chinese participation in relief 
operations are examined. Like the previous chapter, humanitarian relief is defined as the 
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monetary funds, people, and equipment provided by the Chinese government to a non-
Chinese country or territory that has been struck by a natural disaster. 
Case Studies: Instances of Humanitarian Relief Operations 
 As previously stated, data on China’s humanitarian relief operations are limited as 
the People’s Republic of China strictly controls the public release of government 
information. Despite this limitation, there is some public data on specific instances of 
Chinese relief participation. The Chinese government, “defines ‘humanitarian aid’ quite 
narrowly as cash assistance and the dispatch of medical and rescue teams, and other 
forms of assistance can feature as ‘goods and materials’ or ‘complete projects.’”345  The 
resources they do contribute consists primarily of “food, shelter and non-food items, 
health and coordination and support services.”346 In general, the majority of China’s relief 
supports only one or two disasters a year, and most global humanitarian events receive 
limited public acknowledgement from the PRC.347 China consistently donates less 
resources than other countries, and historically has ranked between 19th and 26th on the 
international donations list.348 Their lack of humanitarian relief contrasts their rapid rise 
as an economic power. From 2003 until 2015, China’s GDP increased by nearly 10 
percent a year.349 At the same time, “China’s net development aid…increased by on 
average 24 percent every year” from 2004 to 2011.”350 This aid though, has been 
restricted from relief operations, and is directed at Chinese nation building objectives. 
Publically, “Chinese officials have stated that the government has established an 
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‘emergency response mechanism’ to enable quick dispersal of disaster relief aid in the 
future.”351 Although smaller in scope than other courtiers, this emergency mechanism has 
been used in multiple instances.  
Indian Ocean Tsunami. The first example of Chinese participation in relief 
operations is the Indian Ocean Tsunami that occurred after a magnitude 9.1 Earthquake 
stuck off the coast of India on December 24, 2004.352 Ultimately the resulting damages 
“kill[ed] over 230,000 people and displac[ed] 1.7 million across 14 countries.”353 The 
international community instantly expressed regret and donations poured in from around 
the world. Despite this global movement, China pledge very little towards relief efforts 
(Figure 2).354 Initially, the PRC only promised $3 million, which was less than $2 per 
displaced person.355 The international backlash was instantaneous, but China did not 
respond to the pressure until their political rival, Taiwan, pledge $50 US million.356 
Taiwan has a significantly smaller economy than China, but still offered more relief then 
them.357 The contentious relationship between China and Taiwan is well documented, 
and China could not allow Taiwan to donate more than them, so they increased their 
pledge to $60 million. At the end of the operation China reported that it had offered a 
total of $83 million to the disaster, but it is unconfirmed if all of this aid was actually 
 
351. Evan Medeiros, “China’s Expanding Diplomatic Toolkit,” in China’s International Behavior: 
Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification. (RAND Corporation, 2009), 70. 




353. Eddie Bernard, “Tsunamis: Are We Underestimating the Risk?,” Oceanography 25, no. 2 (2012): 208.   








distributed.358Additionally, the PRC deployed medical teams to the area to assist in the 
relief operations. At the time, this was the largest relief operation in the history of the 
PRC.359  
Haiti Earthquake. A second example of Chinese humanitarian relief occurred 
after Haiti experienced a magnitude 7.0 earthquake on January 12, 2010. 360  In common 
theme, international support was rapid, and resources poured in to support the now 1.5 
million displaced people.361 Combined, “'more than 50 countries kicked in $5.3 billion in 
all,” but China, “ponied up a miserly $1.5 million, comparable to the donations made by 
Gambia and Monaco (Figure 3).”362 Despite the low number, China worked in this 
instance to ensure that the funds and support they did provide were instantaneous. 363 The 
government ensured they were public with their support and state media quickly declared 
noble intentions behind the donations.364 However, critics identified that “they strategized 
their emergency assistance to achieve broader political objectives.”365 Again, as the relief 
operation continued, the PRC eventually raised their donations to a total of $5.91 million, 
but the most significant aspect of this relief operation was that China ensured that its 
supplies were the first to arrive at the scene. They “sent a cargo plane with 90 tons of 
humanitarian aid” to Haiti and it arrived “before United States Navy vessels reached the 
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country.”366 In addition to a cargo plane, the PRC expeditiously sent a rescue team to 
help retrieve victims. 
Immediately after the earthquake struck, the Chinese government promptly 
announced that they were “preparing to send a 50-member rescue team, including three 
sniffer dogs,” to the disaster zone. 367 This was despite the fact that China had limited 
diplomatic relations with Haiti.368 China made this decision public and ensured that it was 
announced abroad and at home to its people. Their rescue team was initially a success, 
and the United Nations praised them as  “‘remarkable efficiency,’” while  “Haitian 
leaders publicly thanked” them for their support.369 This praise however came to an 
abrupt halt when the rescue team left Port au Prince “as soon as the bodies of the missing 
Chinese were identified.”370  Initially this event provided China with international praise, 
but concluded with the international community questioning “China’s credentials as a 
‘good global citizen’” 371  
Japanese Tsunami. The next internationally significant relief operation that drew 
Chinese support was the Japanese Tsunami in 2011.  When a 9.1 magnitude 
earthquake372 displaced over 470,000 people373 and destroyed 129,500 homes, China 
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faced a unique situation.374 China and Japan’s contentious relationship is well known, and 
at first glance it would be surprising for China to support Japan. However, “when China's 
Sichuan province was devastated by a 7.9-magnitude earthquake in 2008, leaving an 
estimated 87,000 dead or missing, the response from…Japan, was instantaneous.” Japan 
provided a search and rescue team to the region, and made international headlines 
because they were “the first foreign aid group to arrive” to the disaster stricken area.375 
Now, just three years later, China was faced with a similar decision, and opted to assist 
Japan. 
Some Chinese citizens publicly praised the disaster facing Japan, and went so far 
as to state that the Japanese deserved the suffering. 376 Concurrently though, memories of 
Japan’s prior assistance led to “new respect…for Japanese virtues.”377 Immediately after 
the earthquake, “Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao offered his ‘deep sympathy and solicitude’ 
as well as assistance,” and the PRC sent a small 15 member rescue team, which was “the 
first disaster team from China ever sent to Japan.”378 Additionally, the growing public 
support for Japan led to a drastic increase in public donations. In the end, China donated a 
total of “$4.5 million in humanitarian assistance as the first plane-load of blankets, tents 
and emergency lights flew out of Shanghai.”379 The message from the PRC on state run 
media was that China was united with the world to assist their neighbor through this 
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tragedy. The news outlets went so far as to announce that the “‘willingness and readiness 
to help each other is just a natural reflection of the time-honored friendly bond between 
the two neighboring Oriental civilizations,” and that “the virtue of returning the favor 
after receiving one runs in the bloods of both nations.’”380 This humanitarian relief held 
social significance, but on the international level, China was still far behind other 
developed countries in quantity of funds donated (Figure 4). In the immediate aftermath 
of the disaster a total of “seventeen countries rushed search and rescue teams to Japan.” 
381 There were a total of “796 individuals on the ground,” of which, only 15, were 
Chinese,” and those rescuers only worked for 16 days.382 In addition to this contingent, 
China offered medical aid from their Navy, but Tokyo turned down the offer.383  
North Korea.  As an individual example, one of the countries that China provides 
consistent humanitarian relief to is North Korea. Historically, international relations with 
the DPRK is contentious, and other countries are hesitant to provide relief to the region 
because of their leader Kim Jong Un. However, “in theory, humanitarian aid is unrelated 
to sanctions and an exception under U.N. Security Council resolutions for humanitarian 
assistance.”384 China frequently provides relief despite this international pressure. As an 
example, in 2016, over 100,000 people were displaced as North Korea experienced 
flooding during “ its worst disaster since World War II.”385 A typhoon ravaged the region 
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and “ripped through villages along the Tumen River, near the border with China.”386 
Against the rest of the world,  China quickly “announced a $3 million relief package” to 
assist with the flooding.387 Included in this package was cash “for humanitarian aid and 
reconstruction projects.”388 Additionally, China has utilized its own Red Cross 
organization to provide emergency supplies after other disasters struck the North Korea. 
Examples of this include a 2004 donation of $1.2 million “worth of emergency relief 
supplies following a massive railway explosion near the Chinese border that killed 161 
people and injured at least 1,300.” China use disasters such as this to couple their relief 
with the Chinese Red Cross in order to provide a “broader package including additional 
aid materials and relief teams.”389 Humanitarian relief with the DPRK is just a portion of 
the nonstandard relief that China provides around the world. 
 China also provides humanitarian relief to other neighboring countries. Aside 
from North Korea, “China was the sixth largest donor to the earthquake response in 
Nepal in 2015; the largest donor in Cambodia in 2011; and the third largest donor in 
North Korea in 2011. “390Of note, even with their rivalry, China has offered $100,000 in 
relief to Taiwan in 2012 after the country experienced flooding.391 Most of the disasters 
that receive global funding and attention do not receive much acknowledgement from 
China. “For example, China allocated 62 percent of its entire humanitarian spend in 2015 
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on Nepal, whereas the largest allocations of global funding that year went on the Syria 
crisis (Nepal came third).”392 In 2011, China provided significant relief to several East 
African countries during a severe drought.  In total the PRC “allocated 79% of its 
humanitarian aid to…Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti,” while the rest of the world 
divided their focus onto many different disasters. 393 During that year,  the international 
community “focused on Somalia, Sudan, Japan (the tsunami), Kenya, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Afghanistan (in that order).”394 While there was some 
overlap, China acted on its own and prioritized the disasters with their own criteria.  
China’s government officials and state media regularly advertise their 
humanitarian relief operations and announce how their intentions are “motivated by a 
desire to prevent or relieve human suffering.”395 Furthermore, they praise their own 
actions as “selfless,” and argue that their relief efforts are “derived from ‘traditional 
Chinese virtues’ of generosity and friendliness.” 396  The PRC frames their assistance as 
beneficial to the international community and “‘the creation of harmonious world’”397 
Any decision to participate in disaster relief must be approved by Chinese leadership, 
who work to maximize the positive message the relief provides. As an example, when 
China provides relief to North Korea, it is publicly announced during “leaders’ visits, 
major anniversaries, DPRK leadership transitions, or humanitarian disasters,” to provide 
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the maximum political impact.398 
Analysis 
The limited data on China’s humanitarian relief operations still demonstrate 
trends in China’s decision making process, and can help answer the question: why does 
China participate in less humanitarian relief operations than other developed countries? 
The hypothesis is that China decision to provide relief is closely linked to their 
humanitarian aid priorities. This analysis references the trends identified in the literature 
review and compares them to the case studies to answer this question.  
Against International Norms. China’s foreign policy decision making 
consistently goes against international norms, and their humanitarian relief operations 
follow the same trend. China donates fewer resources than most developed countries, and 
fails to succumb to international pressure like other countries do. While China increased 
their overall donations to both the Indian Ocean Tsunami, Haiti, and the Japanese 
Tsunami, it was still far below that of other developed countries. China’s initial pledge to 
Haiti was a measly $1.5 million. 399  Eventually they raised it to $5.91400 million, only 
.11% of the $5.3 billion401 that was donated by the combined international community. 
The interesting aspect of China’s Haiti relief was that it was initially a great success for 
China after their rescue team received praise from the international community. Despite 
this positive note, China only increased their pledge by $4.41 million before the disaster 
was contained. 
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The next example of China deviating from international norms is seen in how 
they prioritize their relief operations. China’s relief budget is small, and they only 
commit to a few disasters every year. In 2011, China gave 79 percent of their relief funds, 
a significant portion, to African countries suffering from a drought.402 This was despite 
the Japanese Tsunami that dominated the news around the world that year. Included on 
this list was Djibouti which is a central node in the trade route from the Red Sea, and an 
important ally to America.403 This scenario demonstrates that China provides relief only 
to countries that it thinks are important to maintain relationships with and minimizes the 
resources sent to other disaster areas.  
Economic Goals. Most of the relief that China provided in the case studies 
consisted of medical teams and food supplies. These donations largely counter their usual 
goal of mutually beneficial aid. The only example found that aligned with this priority 
was with their construction teams that they provided to North Korea. These teams 
repaired existing infrastructure, and provided jobs to Chinese workers. Of course, the 
flooding that China responded to was on the border of the two countries, so this 
construction could have also been for many Chinese that may have been affected by the 
disaster. Additionally, North Korea is still a trading partner for China, and these damages 
made it more difficult to continue cross border trading.   
China’s aid often focuses on countries that are important to their own 
international plans.  Their foreign policy draws influence from The Five Principles of 
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Peaceful Co-Existence agreement, which contains the fundamentals of their decision 
making for relief operations. In particular, this document can be used to justify relief 
operations for neighboring countries.404 Their “humanitarian assistance is related to 
Peripheral Diplomacy: a way of demonstrating to its neighbors that China is their 
indispensable partner.”405 In these examples, China contributed to North Korea, Nepal, 
and Cambodia more than most other international countries. The PRC did this because 
they want “to assure other countries, especially regional partners, that its rise [does] not 
pose a threat to world peace and security, and that [they] promote a peaceful international 
environment, and friendly relations with other nations.”406 China wants their neighbors to 
trust them and work with them to improve their trade through the OBOR initiative. 
Neighboring countries are crucial to recreating the Silk Road and placing China at the 
center of a global trade network.  
Soft Power. In two of the case studies above, China expedited their relief and 
received praise from around the world. Their quick response and the public reaction 
provided a boost in soft power and offset the lower pledge given by the PRC. The best 
example of soft power from China came from the 15-member team that they sent to Haiti. 
This timely decision was lauded by the United Nations, and set China up for success. 
Despite this, China erased that good soft power gain when they quickly removed their 
team after all Chinese citizens in the earthquake had been identified. Part of this may 
have been due to the weak political relationship between Haiti and China, but regardless 
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of the official reason for their withdrawal, this decision demonstrates China’s true 
intentions. While China is pursuing gains in soft power, they are setting their own 
priorities for where they project it, and in this instance they did not see a lot of potential 
in more humanitarian relief.  
This decision also highlighted one of the interesting trends in Chinese relief 
operations. In two of the case studies, Japan and Haiti, China made international 
headlines as the first country to respond. At the same time, China was one of the first 
countries to leave. This strategy gives them positives headlines and a small boost in soft 
power at the initial onset of the disaster. They are able to tell their allies and the Chinese 
citizens that they are indispensable members of the international community, and frame 
their relief efforts in a way the demonstrates positive attributes of the PRC. After this 
initial praise ends, they quickly meet their minimal goals (like finding all Chinese 
citizens) and quickly and quietly leave the disaster zone.  
Additionally, China’s decision to help Japan also demonstrated an increase in soft 
power. Japan is a close neighbor to China, but their relationship has a strong history of 
distrust. China’s decision to assist Japan largely came from the debt they owed Japan for 
previous help. Furthermore, the resources China provided to Japan compared to those that 
Japan previously gave to China. This restricted amount of resources and small search and 
rescue team are in line with the rest of the PRC’s relief operations, but China framed this 
assistance as a duty to their close Asian neighbors. Their decision to help was praised 
around the world because of their existing negative relationship with Japan. China even 
offered additional aid in the form of the Chinese Navy, but Japan denied that offer 





The last way that China exercised soft power in the case studies was through their 
Indian Ocean Tsunami pledge. While their initial donation was low, China made a 
statement when they contributed more relief than Taiwan. Their pledge, $60 million, was 
still far below other countries, but China cares about outperforming Taiwan. In fact, 
scholars argue that China’s aid after the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 was increased to 
beat Taiwan’s pledge, and through this act, China improved its soft power in the 
region.407  
Conclusion  
The One Belt One Road initiative requires international support in order to be 
completed, and the 65 countries included in the plan play a critical role in Chinese 
foreign policy.  China wants these countries to support them and their economic growth. 
In order to accomplish this, they need to at least appear that they will help these countries 
when they are in need. When China provides small donations and medical teams, they are 
meeting a basic expectation to show up and help those in a crisis. The PRC does not 
believe that humanitarian relief is a critical aspect to their OBOR plan. Rather, they 
believe that because they invest so much already in aid and nation building, they are 
already improving their soft power. The political reasons to participate in humanitarian 
relief include increased soft power and improved relationships. China gets this already 
with their reach from the OBOR initiative. They provide infrastructure to countries that 
do not have it, and despite some of these agreements ending poorly, they still expand 
their influence around the world with these deals. Additionally, humanitarian relief does 
not meet one of China’s most highlighted priorities because it is not economically 
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beneficial like China’s aid projects are. The examples provided in the literature review 
demonstrate that their development projects increase trade routes and give China access 
to natural resources. Food and medical supply donations do not directly impact the 
economy in the way that China prefers. Thus, China’s humanitarian relief efforts are 
significantly smaller than other developed countries like the United States, but the bottom 




































This thesis aimed to improve upon existing humanitarian relief studies in order to 
better understand the reasons a country participates in relief operations. Its primary goal 
was to improve upon the current understanding of this unique form of policy because if 
nations can better understand what factors contribute to successful international support, 
then they can more efficiently respond when a disaster strikes and save more lives.  
Millions of people have been affected by natural disasters over the last four decades, and 
the international community historically has rallied around them to provide support.408 
Compared to the rest of the word, the United States is incredibly generous with 
humanitarian relief.409 They donate a substantial amount of funds to world disasters, and 
humanitarianism has become ingrained in their national policy. The topic of American 
humanitarianism and relief operations is underdeveloped, and this paper intended to 
improve upon it through multiple case studies. The first chapter explored the background 
of American humanitarianism to find the cultural precedence behind it. The next two 
chapters looked at policy decision making in regards to the United States and China, two 
countries whose approaches towards relief are completely different. Ultimately, this 
paper supports the current humanitarian relief operations research and further highlights 
the complex factors that contribute to any country’s decision to assist another nation in 
need. 
Chapter one identified that the basics of humanitarianism are not new, especially 
in the United States. When a country adapts this belief into its political strategy, the 
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expectation is that they will assist people in need both at home and abroad.410 Throughout 
the years the United States has developed its own generous standard for humanitarianism 
that began with the Founding Fathers’ intent behind the Declaration of Independence. 
The basic human rights of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” exist for all, and it 
is the duty of the United States to protect and expand these rights.411 This concept has 
been reinforced through the actions of former politicians throughout the years, such as 
President Lincoln, Albert Beveridge, President Wilson, and President Hoover. This 
chapter further focused on the life of Herbert Hoover, a man who is primarily associated 
with the Great Depression, despite being world renown as a humanitarian. This chapter 
demonstrated that Hoover’s legacy, while mixed, is properly placed in its lasting 
influence on humanitarian aid. Hoover’s actions protected millions of people and he truly 
epitomized the ideal American humanitarian. His humanitarian efforts shaped the 
American concept of giving, and his life demonstrated that a single individual can have a 
lasting impact on a nation. Three themes from Hoover’s relief operations continue to this 
day. The first is that United States relief contributions largely come from individual 
citizens. Additionally, American religious organizations have a significant influence on 
the distribution of aid. Lastly, the United States strives to provide lasting relief to a 
disaster stricken country, and enables displaced people to take care of themselves.  
 Chapter two demonstrated that the United States’ decision to provide 
humanitarian aid to a country or region in need is based on many political factors. The 
literature review reached two reasons countries participate in humanitarian relief 
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operations: moral obligation and soft power benefits. It also identified two reasons for 
why they do not provide aid: the legality of participation and the difficulties with 
implementing relief. The United States’ government provided substantial relief in both 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2011 Japanese Tsunami. The overall objective of 
this chapter was to discover if the United States is more likely to assist a country when it 
has a stronger relationship with them. In these case studies, America had a stronger 
relationship with Japan than with Indonesia, India, or Sri Lanka. Overall, both events 
support the existing literature on humanitarian relief operations, but they only loosely 
support the claim that a strong existing relationship impacts the amount of aid America 
provides. The most significant supporting factor is that the United States only increased 
their pledged aid for the Indian Ocean Tsunami after intense international backlash.412 
This decision made it appear that the United States did not care about those affected, and 
negatively impacted their soft power in the region. After this backlash, America provided 
substantial funds to the area which, coincidentally, also served a strategic role in the War 
on Terror.413 Furthermore, the United States responded much quicker in Japan and 
support arrived within 24 hours of the event. This may be due to the strong relationship 
between Japan and the United States, but the military presence stationed in country may 
also have played a significant role.  
Chapter three switched the focus from the United States to it geopolitical rival, 
China. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has aggressively pushed it new expansion 
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program, the One Belt One Road initiative (OBOR). This ambitious economic 
development plan is designed to connect 65 countries into a recreation of the ancient Silk 
Road.414 To link these countries, China has invested heavily in aid and nation-building 
projects. Previous literature identified three trends in this policy: China cares little about 
international norms, the PRC primarily delivers relief in a way that improves their own 
economy, and they utilize humanitarian aid to increase their soft power. Compared to the 
rest of the international community, China donates far less to relief operations.415 This 
chapter searched to discover why China does this, and reached three overarching 
conclusions. The first is that the PRC will donate the minimum to maintain their 
relationship with countries that serve a role in their OBOR initiative. When China 
provides small donations and medical teams, they are meeting a basic expectation to 
show up and help those in a crisis. Furthermore, the PRC does not believe that 
humanitarian relief is a critical aspect to their OBOR plan. One of the most significant 
political reasons to participate in humanitarian relief is to increase soft power in the 
affected region. China, does not find value in relief operations, and thinks that, because 
they invest so much already in aid and nation building, they already receive a boost in 
soft power. Lastly, humanitarian relief does not meet one of China’s OBOR goals 
because it is not economically beneficial like China’s aid projects are. The donation of 
food and medical supplies only takes from the Chinese economy, and does not provide 
the mutually beneficial economic growth that the PRC prefers with its aid projects.  
The conclusions reached in this thesis have interesting policy implications for the 
 
414. Hong Zhao, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ASEAN,” China: An International Journal 17, no. 
2, (2019):127. 
415. Miwa Hirono, Exploring the Links Between Chinese Foreign Policy and Humanitarian Action: 





United States and China. The first is that American humanitarianism is ingrained in the 
politics of the United States, and will indefinitely continue to be a dominate political 
force. Americans are uniquely influenced by the founding principles in the Declaration of 
Independence, and history has demonstrated that the natural rights of man provide a basis 
that shapes the political landscape of the United States. These rights draw significant 
parallels to the best qualities of humanitarian relief, which will ensure humanitarianism’s 
existence in American policy. Furthermore, the public support that springs from the 
religious organizations within the United States ensures that democratic legislators will 
continue to incorporate humanitarianism into their politics. Additionally, chapter two 
demonstrated that there is strategic value to the United States’ decision to provide aid that 
further guarantees American participation. The hypothesis that the United States would 
send more money to countries that they were close allies with was inconclusive, and it 
appears that America will provide relief so long as there is public and international 
support for it. This concept seems intuitive for democratic politics, but as the 
humanitarian works of Herbert Hoover demonstrated, when the American people support 
aid operations, both individuals and religious organizations will rally around a disaster. In 
the future, politicians and citizens can develop strategies to improve public awareness of 
a particular event that needs support. Further studies could examine how likely 
humanitarian relief operations are to gain public support, and could identify what specific 
factors contribute to an increase in awareness.  
The next significant takeaway from this thesis revolves around the international 





stated that it wants to overtake America as the dominate player internationally.416 To do 
this, they began their aggressive OBOR economic initiative, and consistently challenge 
the United States’ global interests. Current news headlines constantly identify ways that 
China continues to challenge America’s global influence, and at times, it seems like the 
United States is falling behind the efforts of China.417 This thesis identifies at least one 
way that the United States will continue to outperform the PRC, with humanitarian relief 
operations. The United States and China have completely different approaches on how to 
address this unique policy, but they still both participate in them. It appears that China 
realizes that providing no relief would be extremely damaging to their global image, so 
they do the minimum to demonstrate that they care.  Their level of commitment to relief 
does not match their current economic growth, and the international community is aware 
of this deficit. This has strong implications for China’s soft power growth. The PRC will 
find it difficult to overtake the United States in soft power influence despite their nation-
building programs because the world does not see them as a team player. Surprisingly, 
this approach goes against the “the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence” outlined in 
chapter three, specifically the principle of peaceful coexistence.418 Unlike the United 
States, humanitarian relief operations are not yet ingrained into Chinese culture. A further 
study could research if this is due the priorities of the PRC, or if there is a deeper 
ideological difference. 
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The international community has announced that they expect China to do more 
with relief operations, but despite this, the PRC has failed to succumb to any international 
pressure. Additionally, the low number of resources provided to countries in need could 
lead to doubts about Chinese commitment to various countries. China’s nation building 
programs are significant, but as it becomes increasingly evident that they are only 
interested in furthering the PRC’s objectives, their loans and aid will become less 
tempting. The United States should take advantage of this weakness in Chinese foreign 
policy and continue to be a world leader in humanitarian relief operations. This will help 
America maintain its status as a world leader, and will positively influence other 
countries to continue to do the same. 
Of course, there is a chance China’s strategy pays off, and their booming 
economy compensates for this loss in soft power. An interesting thought is that if China 
surpasses the United States and becomes the greatest power, does that mean humanitarian 
aid will decline around the world? This balance shift would lead to new alliances, and 
new priorities that could greatly impact how relief operations are performed. 
Additionally, it is possible that the initial praise China receives from quickly arriving to 
disaster areas still provides them with enough soft power to negate any negative publicity 
after they leave. The only way that this could be determined is through future studies, 
which could examine this possibility by surveying at-risk disaster areas prior to any 
event, and then resurveying the same population after a disaster happens and China 
provides relief.  
This thesis has a number of weaknesses that must be addressed. First and 





its conclusions. This thesis mitigated this weakness by limiting the scope of which relief 
operations are used as case studies in chapters two and three. It selected only relief 
operations that occurred after a natural disaster, and did not analyze operations that were 
required due to war. Any additional research that is conducted on these topics should use 
different case studies to strengthen any conclusions. Furthermore, alternative 
explanations for analysis were acknowledged throughout the paper when they were 
appropriate. An additional weakness was that information on China’s decision making is 
extremely limited due to the PRC’s secretive policies. The data provided are public 
records and exist in previous research, but the results of this assessment on China is based 
on limited facts.  
Ultimately, the decision for a country to participate in humanitarian relief 
operations varies from country to country. No one disaster is alike, and because of this, 
each response is different. This thesis tried to identify the trends within these complex 
decision making processes. Relief operations call upon the greatest qualities of mankind. 
They are a powerful political tool that enables a country and its politicians to achieve 
multiple objectives at once. A well-timed response to a disaster provides a country with a 
boost in international soft power, and is popular with the citizens back home. Natural 
disasters are inevitable, and it is through a gained understanding of relief operations that 
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Figure 3  
Haiti Earthquake Donations  
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Figure 4  
Japanese Tsunami Donations  
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